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ABSTRACT
Federal efforts to reform federal securities class actions now reverberate
in state courts and in individual actions. This article explores emerging
consequences driven by national litigation trends and the Securities
Litzgation Unform Standards Act (SLUSA). I ague that a new
dnamic, class disaggregation, has begun to occur. Individual investors
may be following institutional investors into state courts in search of
better litigation outcomes. Given these developments, I ague that
Congress should consider further reforms to level the field and ensure
that private parties resolve disputes involving national market securities
under consistent standards.
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INTRODUCTION
C ONGRESSIONAL inaction and inattention may eventually allow privatesecurities class action litigation to unravel as increasing numbers of
plaintiffs opt out of federal class actions in favor of individual actions.
Although prior waves of reform have sought to federalize securities fraud
class action litigation,' the reforms left the door open for plaintiffs bringing
individual actions to utilize state law and escape federal procedural
constraints. Plaintiffs considering whether to remain within a federal class
action or to exit the class in favor of an individual action may elect to pursue
state law claims in state courts or federal law claims in federal court. The
option to exit to state law and state court may soon draw increasing numbers
of opt-out actions seeking to take advantage of friendlier procedures,
expansive substantive law, and larger payouts. Despite these strong
incentives, federal limitations continue to shape how plaintiffs may opt out.
1Earlier waves of reform have sought to address so-called strike suits and forum flight. See
Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of
Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 293 (1998).
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This article is the first to examine critically two new unintended
consequences of securities litigation reform and their implications. First, the
federal scheme for securities class action litigation has effectively banished
many individual state law claims from federal court. This reality, in
connection with a well-documented trend toward institutional investors
opting out of federal class actions to pursue higher-value individual claims in
state court,2 has led to the second new and unexplored dynamic: plaintiffs'
attorneys have begun to aggregate lower-value individual claims outside of
federal class actions, using a technique I call class disaggregation. I define
disaggregated classes as collections of dispersed but coordinated state court
actions alleging largely duplicative claims that would be precluded by federal
law if consolidated into a single action.
While non-class aggregation has been occurring for some time in a variety
of contexts, few scholars have addressed the topic. This article focuses on
non-class aggregation in the securities fraud litigation context and how the
rise of these disaggregated classes challenges the current regulatory structure
for securities litigation.
These new developments result from past reform efforts. Many
plaintiffs' lawyers evaded the federal court procedural restrictions imposed by
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)4 by filing
securities fraud class actions in state courts. To address this forum-shifting
issue, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 (SLUSA). 5 "SLUSA precludes both state and federal courts from
adjudicating certain class actions that are based upon state statutory or
common law and that allege a misrepresentation in connection with the
purchase or sale of [covered securities]."' Noting that SLUSA does not
ordinarily apply to individual securities fraud claims, the Supreme Court has
explained that SLUSA itself does not displace state law with federal law but
2 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288, 311 (2010) (explaining that institutional investors are now opting out "on an
unprecedented scale"); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 1109, 1132 (2011) (discussing trend toward opting out).
3 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 5 (2009) (noting that nonclass aggregation has been little discussed).
4 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
s Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
6 Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Cout, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 349
(2011).
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makes some state-law claims nonactionable through the class-action device in
both federal and state courts.7
Aimed primarily at securities fraud class actions, SLUSA contains
exceptions for disputes related to corporate governance.8 For instance, under
the so-called "Delaware Carve-Out," SLUSA permits state law class actions
"based upon the statutory or common law of the state in which the issuer is
incorporated."9
To the extent SLUSA sought to increase uniformity, the statute has only
partially achieved its goals. Today, increasing numbers of investors-both
institutional and individual-may be using disaggregated classes to escape the
federal securities laws and federal class action restrictions in favor of
individual state court and state law actions, neatly sidestepping SLUSA's ban
on state law class actions and the PSLRA's restrictions.10
Escaping the restrictions imposed by SLUSA and the PSLRA translates
into large returns for certain investors, possibly at the expense of investors
remaining within the federal class. Professor Coffee notes that institutional
investors who opt out of securities fraud class actions to bring their own
individual actions may sometimes recover significantly more than they would
have as a member of the class. 1 In at least one case, investors who pursued
individual actions may have recovered more than all of the class members
combined. 12 Investors may be able to command higher settlement premiums
in these state court actions because they are not subject to federal restrictions
and their state law claims are more likely to survive in state court forums. 1 3 If
the actions are moved to federal court, the reversal of fortune can be
dramatic; in many instances, SLUSA forces plaintiffs to forfeit their state law
claims in federal court by operation of law. 14
7 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006).
8 Johnson, supra note 6, at 357.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i), 77p(d)(i)(A).
10 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why "Exit"
Works Better Than "Voice", 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 407, 425-31 (2008) (discussing the
accelerating trend in non-class litigation).
11 Id. at 417.
12 Id. at 427-28 (discussing Quest class action).
13 For a more complete discussion of why investors receive a premium for litigating state
court actions under state law, see infra Part II.
14 How does this happen? SLUSA expansively defines class actions. 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii). Its "covered class action" definition includes any "groups of lawsuits" in
the same court that are consolidated or coordinated in any way. When combined with
federal consolidation procedures in multidistrict litigation, this provision allows
defendants to extinguish state law claims by moving individual actions into the same
court. Thus, federal transfer and consolidation motions already effectively transmute
9:305 (2015) Disaggregated Classes 309
Because federal procedural processes move these opt-out actions within
SLUSA's terms, increasing numbers of plaintiffs now seek to litigate state
fraud claims in state court so that their cases may not be easily combined.
Large institutional investors have led the exodus, but many individual
investors may soon be following them out the door. Although most
individuals have historically held "negative value claims" that were too costly
to litigate on an individual basis, some innovative plaintiffs' lawyers have
deployed disaggregated classes to cost-effectively aggregate smaller individual
claims for state court litigation.15 These disaggregated classes allow plaintiffs'
lawyers to litigate claims that would otherwise be too small to litigate outside
the class action device.16
These disaggregated classes are not merely a theoretical response to
SLUSA's preclusion of state law class actions. They have arisen in litigation
related to Enron, Worldcom, and Madoff.17 For example, in Newby v. Enron
Corp.,18 plaintiffs' counsel used a disaggregated class to aggregate state law
claims in the aftermath of Enron's collapse.19 Plaintiffs' counsel represented
over 750 plaintiffs, but "artfully avoided [SLUSA] by filing lawsuits in
counties across the State of Texas that are not denominated class actions and
individual securities actions into covered classes under SLUSA-resulting in the
preclusion of plaintiffs' state law claims. This aggregation process regularly occurs when
individual, i.e. non-class, securities actions appear in federal court, so SLUSA has
effectively exiled many state law claims from federal court. This dynamic is discussed in
greater detail in Part I.
15 Professor Coffee predicted in 2008 that this was a likely implication flowing from higher
recoveries in state individual actions than in federal court class actions. Coffee, supra note
10, at 435-36 ("Over time, lower cost competitors will almost certainly surface within the
plaintiffs bar that are willing to undertake suit for opt out claimants with much smaller
losses.").
16 While disaggregated classes might also arise to evade the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 ("CAFA"), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.), I put CAFA to the side for this article because CAFA exempts the federal
securities laws from its provisions and because SLUSA has a lower threshold for its
group-of-lawsuits provision. Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the juisdictional Framework for
Pvate Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 621, 622 (2006)
(discussing CAFA's exemption of the federal securities laws).
17 See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2004 WL 692746 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2004); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Tremont Sec.
Law, State Law, & Ins. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 11117, 2013 WL 4730263 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2013).
18 302 F.3d 295.
19 Id. at 298.
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each with fewer than 50 plaintiffs." 20 In a decision affirming a district court
injunction against filing additional state court actions, the Fifth Circuit
described this disaggregated class:
[Plaintiffs' counsel] has thus far filed at least seven lawsuits
in state courts throughout Texas, alleging securities fraud
arising out of the business failure of Enron Corporation.
Each suit stated claims for fewer than fifty plaintiffs in
complaints crafted to avoid the provisions of [SLUSA],
which made federal court the exclusive venue for class
actions alleging fraud in the sale of [national market]
securities. 21
Despite concerns about duplicative suits, the Fifth Circuit refused to
"question the filing of suits tailored to avoid federal jurisdiction" in state
court. 2 2 However, this disaggregated class did not last. After Enron declared
bankruptcy, defendants were able to consolidate the scattered state court
cases into federal court by use of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Then, SLUSA's
group-of-lawsuits provision then required the court to dismiss all claims. 23
Proliferating individual securities actions under state law and the use of
disaggregated classes raise serious concerns. 24 Many concerns fall into two
main categories: (1) problems generated by duplicative litigation and
inconsistent liability standards for national market securities; and (2)
implications of the growing numbers of opt-out plaintiffs for the beleaguered
securities class action.
As to the concerns about litigation costs and inconsistent liability,
disaggregated classes threaten the policy choices behind the PSLRA and
SLUSA. I critically examine the history of private securities litigation and
show how these statutes are part of the trend toward federal control over the
20 Id. at 302.
21 Id. at 298.
22 Id. at 303. The district court and the Fifth Circuit did enjoin plaintiffs' counsel from
filing additional state court suits because of his "rude refusals to afford opposing counsel
the common courtesy of notice" before filing each additional duplicative suit. Id. at 303.
23 In re Enron Corp. Sec., 535 F.3d 325, 342 (5th Cir. 2008).
24 Although writing outside of the securities area, Professor J. Maria Glover has discussed
issues associated with non-removable state court actions pending alongside complex
multidistrict litigation and found that "little scholarly attention has been devoted to the
problem of non-removable state-court actions." J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation
Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The Problems and Promise of Non-Removable State Actions
in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 3, 5 (2012).
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national securities markets. With both the PSLRA and SLUSA, Congress
sought to increase uniformity and federal control over the market for
nationally traded securities. 25 The statutes cannot achieve their goals if
investors abandon federal class actions and the federal forum in favor of
duplicative individual actions under state law. More practically, extensive pre-
trial litigation and discovery in multiple forums leads to inefficient use of
judicial resources and the resources of litigants. 26 It also increases the
likelihood of inconsistent outcomes for similarly situated plaintiffs and
defendants litigating in different fora. 27
For securities class actions, this means that plaintiffs escaping SLUSA's
dragnet may siphon funds away from investors trapped within the class
action.28 If more sophisticated institutional investors withdraw to state courts
and many individuals with larger claims follow them out the door, the
plaintiffs left within the class may struggle to control their counsel because of
higher agency costs in monitoring and making informed decisions. 29
Given these costs, the rationale seems weak for allowing opt-outs to
continue pursuing state law securities fraud claims. Federal authority is best
positioned to provide primary oversight of the national securities markets. As
more actions move outside the federal courts and federal law, the national
interest in moving toward preemption of state laws increases. Shifting more
authority to the federal legal system may yield substantial benefits. I break
down these benefits and explain how increased federal control aligns with
optimal deterrence theory and economic theories of federalism. Reforming
the current structure may also improve the conduct of securities class counsel
by making it possible for class counsel to keep opt-outs within the class.
While a range of responses might be feasible, I argue that the simplest
means of addressing the issue is to make opt-out actions and disaggregated
classes removable to federal court. Existing consolidation procedures,
combined with SLUSA's group-of-lawsuits provision, already preclude opt-
out plaintiffs in federal court from litigating state law claims. Removing state
25 H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 9-11 (1998).
26 See, e.g., Glover, supra note 24, at 6; Coffee, supra note 10, at 408 ("For some time, public
policy has been guided by the implicit assumption that an all-inclusive class was desirable"
to minimize repetitive litigation and conserve resources.).
27 The odds of inconsistency increase because, instead of having one judge decide an issue,
many different judges may be forced to decide nearly identical motions.
28 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 409 ("[]he gains to those class members who exit the class
could come at the expense of the smaller shareholders who remain in the class.").
29 See supra note 1, at 273-79 (discussing agency cost issues).
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court opt-out actions and disaggregated classes to federal court will provide
much needed uniformity and a check against inconsistent outcomes.
In Part I of this Article, I critically examine the history of private
securities litigation, showing the trend toward increased federal power over
national market securities. In Part II, I discuss the accelerating trend toward
opting out of securities class actions and the rise of the disaggregated class as
a cost-effective vehicle for aggregating lower-value claims. In Part III, I argue
that increasing the use of opt-out litigation in state court and under state law
would not be a positive reform of securities class actions and that Congress
should optimize private securities litigation by consolidating more securities
litigation into federal court, effectively precluding the litigation of many state
law claims.
I. THE TREND TOWARD FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
Today's securities litigation environment reflects a series of steps toward
greater federal power in regulating securities sales and liabilities. This Part
describes each in turn.
A. Dual Federal & State Regulation
Initially, securities litigation developed in the state law context. State laws
creating liability for securities fraud, known as Blue Sky laws, appeared in the
1910s. 0 Prompted by concerns about "the sudden popularity of speculative
securities," Kansas passed the first Blue Sky law in 1911.31 Other states soon
joined and passed their own laws to protect their citizens from sellers of
fraudulent securities.3 2 In addition to requiring robust disclosures, state Blue
Sky laws also often regulated the quality of the securities offered on a merit
basis-giving state officials the power to examine whether the securities were
substantively suitable for sale. 3
These new laws were controversial. Because securities were generally
traded in interstate commerce, many people initially questioned whether the
Supreme Court would permit individual states to regulate nationally traded
products. In 1917, the Supreme Court put these doubts to rest and upheld
3o Perino, supra note 1, at 279-80 (describing history of Blue Sky laws).
31 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ongin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REv. 347,
359-60 (1991) (describing the origin of state Blue Sky laws).
32 Perino, supra note 1, at 280.
33 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[2], at
33 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION].
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state securities statutes as constitutional in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., effectively
recognizing that in the absence of federal regulation, states could validly
regulate securities offerings despite any indirect burden on interstate
commerce.3 4 After Hall, more states passed their own Blue Sky laws, "saving
investors millions of dollars that otherwise would have been lost in fraudulent
securities."" By 1933, all but one state had passed Blue Sky laws.36
Still, state-by-state regulation could not effectively regulate the entire
market.3 Although the Supreme Court had blessed state securities regulation
in Hall, it only approved state regulation of securities transactions occurring
within state borders." Because securities could be sold in one state and then
mailed into another, states lacked effective power to regulate the national
securities market. 9 To remedy this issue, many state securities regulators
"advised Congress that a supplemental federal law was needed to stop this
gap."
4 0
National securities regulation in the interest of consumer protection
began only in the aftermath of the Great Depression. In 1933, Congress
passed the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act). 41 President Franklin
Roosevelt celebrated the law as adding, "to the ancient rule of caveat emptor,
the further doctrine, 'Let the seller also beware."'4 2 The law created a number
of private remedies for investors purchasing securities governed by the
Securities Act and has been characterized as "the first true consumer
protection law." 43
Notably, the Securities Act left state Blue Sky laws undisturbed and
explicitly preserved state regulation of securities. As originally formulated,
Section 18 of the Securities Act made clear that the new federal law did not
34 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557 (1917) ("There is no doubt of the supremacy
of the national power over interstate commerce. Its inaction, it is true, may imply
prohibition of state legislation, but it may imply permission of such legislation. In other
words, the burden of the legislation, if it be a burden, may be indirect and valid in the
absence of the assertion of the national power.").
3s Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against
Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REv. 495, 496 (1984).
36 S. REP. No. 73-47, at 2 (1933).
37 See Macey & Miller, supra note 31, at 388.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Warren, supra note 35, at 497 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
41 The Securities Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.
42 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73-5480, at 2 (1933).
43 HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION §1.2[3], at 34.
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preempt state law.44 Section 18 fostered a dual regulatory system that
protected investors and the capital markets with overlapping regulation. 45
As Congress crafted additional federal securities laws after the
Depression, it continued to explicitly preserve state securities regulation. A
year after passing the Securities Act, Congress passed the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), which created the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the Commission) and provided for ongoing regulation. 46 Like
the Securities Act before it, the Exchange Act also included a savings clause
that "was plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state authority." 47
While the national securities regulatory scheme initially embraced dual
state and federal regulation, extensive debates about the merits of a dual
regulatory system have continued. Supporters have celebrated the dual
system for successfully protecting investors and fostering the growth of the
capital markets. 48 Detractors contend that the dual regulatory system raised
the cost of capital by forcing financial institutions engaged in a principally
national business to comply with duplicative and often complex regulation in
every state in the nation as well as with the demands of their federal
regulators. 49 While the proponents of dual regulation initially won the day,
significant later regulation has moved to increase uniformity under federal
oversight.
B. The Rise of Securities Litigation under Rule lOb-5
As federal involvement in securities regulation increased, securities
litigation took on an increasingly federal character. Both public and private
actors enforce federal and state securities laws through litigation or other
means.so Public enforcers include the Commission, the Department of
Justice, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and state
agencies charged with securities enforcement.1 Private litigants may also
44 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(1) ("[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State
over any security or any person. . . .
45 Warren, supra note 35, at 497.
46 The Exchange Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, et seq.
47 Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979).
48 See Warren, supra note 35, at 497.
49 Id. at 498-99.
so See genera/y Amanda M. Rose, The Mutienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A
CriticalAnalysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010).
s1 Id. at 2175.
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bring securities claims and supplement public enforcement of the securities
laWS.5 2
Both public and private enforcers rely heavily on claims under Rule lOb-
5, a rule the Commission promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act." Today, the rule stands as a cornerstone of securities enforcement.5 4 It
assures the market that information provided about securities is not
purposefully false or misleading and imposes liability for dishonesty. The
Supreme Court described the cause of action as "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 5
While the Rule lOb-5 action is widely used today, Congress did not
initially create a Rule lOb-5 cause of action or instruct the Commission to
create a private cause of action.56 Nearly a decade after the Exchange Act
became effective, the Commission enacted Rule lOb-5 to close a loophole in
its own enforcement authority. 7 Although the Commission did not intend to
create a new private cause of action," federal courts found an implied private
right of action within it.s9 Beginning with Kardon v. National Gjpsum Co.,6 0 an
"overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals"6 1
soon developed, leading the Supreme Court to recognize the private right of
action in Superintendent ofIns. ofN.Y. v. Bankers L/fe & Casualt Co.6 2
The elements of a private action under Rule lOb-5 for misrepresentation
and omission actions are well-established, and resemble traditional common
52 Id.
s3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (prohibiting, inter alia, the making of "any untrue statement
of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security").
54 For a more thorough review of rule 10b-5's origin, see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming
Securities Litzgation Reform: Restructuring the Relationshfo Between Pubic and Private Enforcement of
Rule lOb-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008).
ss Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
56 At the outset, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act merely gave the Commission the power
to promulgate regulations banning any manipulative or deceptive devices in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 203 (1976) ("The section was described rightly [by a spokesman for its drafters] as a
'catchall' clause to enable the Commission 'to deal with new manipulative [or cunning]
devices."').
s7 See Rose, Reforming Securities Litzgation Reform, supra note 54, at 1308.
5 Milton Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 891, 922 (1967). See also SEC
Release No. 34-3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804, 3804 (May 22, 1942).
59 See Rose, supra note 54, at 1308.
60 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
61 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
62 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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law fraud and deceit actions. A plaintiff must allege: "(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation." 63
Although Rule lOb-5 claims are similar to traditional fraud and deceit
actions, courts have extensively shaped Rule lOb-5. Most importantly, courts
relaxed the reliance requirement in certain cases. 6 4 In class action litigation,
the rule's fraud-on-the-market presumption often reduces the need to prove
individual reliance because of a rebuttable presumption that investors relied
on the integrity of the stock's price. 65 The fraud-on-the-market presumption
depends on the theory that efficient markets incorporate all publicly available
information about a stock into its price. 66 To use the presumption and
dispense with reliance, plaintiffs merely need to show that the stock traded in
an efficient market and that the alleged misstatements were publicly made. 67
The fraud-on-the-market presumption's relaxed reliance requirement
made many large securities class actions possible. 68 Were it not for the
presumption, "'[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance from each member
of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would' prevent such plaintiffs 'from
proceeding with a class action, since individual issues' would 'overwhelm[] the
common ones."' 69 After the Supreme Court recognized the fraud-on-the-
market presumption, the number of possible plaintiffs and damages
recoverable in private securities class actions increased dramatically. 70
63 See, e.g, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2008).
64 Courts commonly dispense with the reliance requirement when the defendant failed to
reveal information that she had a duty to disclose. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
65 See Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
66 "'The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available
material information regarding the company and its business . . . ."' Basic, 485 U.S. at 241
(quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
67 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton 1), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011).
68 See A.C. Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges As
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 948-49 (1999) ("Fraud on the market class
actions became a cottage industry post-Basic as plaintiffs' attorneys sought compensation
for their defrauded clients and, not incidentally, potentially enormous awards of attorneys'
fees.").
69 Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2185 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 242).
70 Rose, supra note 54, at 1312.
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C. Criticisms of the Securities Class Action Take Hold
With increasing federal litigation came complaints and criticism.
Advocates initially defended securities class action litigation under Rule lOb-5
as consistent with the public interest for both compensating investors and
deterring securities violations.71 Plaintiffs suing under it were lauded as
"private attorneys general" on the belief that the litigation meaningfully
advanced these interests. 72
Yet the narrative soon shifted and private securities litigation fell into
disrepute.73 Critics questioned whether private securities litigation provided
meaningful compensation to investors or served a useful purpose. Many
scholars argued that the typical secondary market securities class action could
not be defended on compensatory grounds, 74 and especially that most
compensation paid is essentially circular and wasteful.75 Payments made by
an issuer to settle a securities class action effectively transferred wealth from
the issuer's current shareholders to the class period shareholders, diminishing
the value of the corporation.76 Transferring wealth between accounts in this
way is not costless; a sizeable portion of shareholder wealth is awarded to the
attorneys involved. A variation of the circularity criticism also exists for well-
diversified shareholders. A diversified shareholder may also own equity
interests in insurance companies that provide coverage for securities fraud
losses and net out gains and losses over time, less attorneys' fees.77
Given the compensatory rationale's weakness, supporters of securities
class action litigation argued that vigilant private enforcement actions would
more effectively deter securities fraud than enforcement by the Commission
71 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1538 (2006) ("From a policy perspective, the
securities class action has two potential rationales: compensation and deterrence."); Tamar
Frankel, Im plied Rights ofAction, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 557 (1981).
72 For a discussion of the term "private attorney general," see William B. Rubenstein, On
What a 'Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004).
7 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 54, at 1315-17.
74 Id. at 1301 ("An academic consensus has emerged that the typical Rule 10b-5 class action
cannot be defended on compensatory grounds.").
7 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIs.
L. REV. 333, 334 (discussing claims that the circularity problem is "socially wasteful
because it merely transfers funds from one set of shareholders to another").
76 For a discussion of this dynamic, see David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in
Securities Class Actions, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 157, 168-69 (2012).
77 Id. at 169.
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alone." Although courts had not emphasized the deterrence rationale when
they implied the private right of action, it soon became the predominant
justification for private securities litigation. 9
The deterrence rationale has not persuaded all. Critics of private
securities fraud class actions argue that private enforcement over-deters
because private plaintiffs pursue all profitable actions. 0 Unlike a private
enforcer, the Commission exercises discretion to temper its enforcement.
Thus, a purely public enforcement regime may be less likely to over-deter
than an enforcement regime that relies on private enforcers.8 2
Securities class actions also faced strong, if somewhat self-serving,
criticism from corporate defendants who argued that securities class actions
were deterring lawful conduct and participation in the capital markets
generally. Corporate defendants made three main complaints: (1) vexatious
strike suits 3 were extorting nuisance settlements; (2) discovery costs were
unbalanced and unfair; and (3) litigation fears had led issuers to avoid making
any forward-looking statements.8 4 Strike suits had been a concern for some
time, leading courts to shrink liability under Rule lOb-5 to address the issue. 5
78 Rose, supra note 54, at 1314-15 (discussing the "revisionist justification for private Rule
10b-5 enforcement").
79 Professor Amanda M. Rose explains how the underlying rationale for private securities
litigation shifted over the decades. See id. at 1310-15.
so Rose, supra note 50, at 2200-01.
81 Paul Radvany, The SEC Adds A New Weapon: How Does the New Admission Requirement
Change the Landscape?, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 675 (2014) (describing
enforcement authority and prosecutorial discretion). Similarly, the Department of Justice,
which brings criminal actions, may also exercise discretion.
82 Of course, a purely public enforcement regime may also under-deter if it fails to enforce
adequately.
83 For a discussion of the "strike suit" issues, see Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let
the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2084-89 (1995).
84 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730
(stating that Congress "heard evidence that abusive practices committed in private
securities litigation include: (1) the routine filing of lawsuits . . . without regard to any
underlying culpability of the issuer . . . ; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants ...
without regard to their actual culpability; [and] (3) the abuse of the discovery process to
impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to
settle").
85 See, e.g., New England Data Serv. Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 288 (1st Cir. 1987) ("In the
context of securities litigation, we have expressed the fear that a plaintiff with a largely
groundless claim will bring a suit and conduct extensive discovery in the hopes of
obtaining an increased settlement, rather than in the hopes that the process will reveal
relevant evidence."). Indeed, concern about "strike suits" led the Supreme Court to limit
liability under Rule 10b-5 in Blue Chfp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc. when it prohibited
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Without questioning the underlying premise that private securities
litigation provided meaningful deterrence benefits, academics, courts and
lawmakers sought to channel the vexatious securities class action to more
productive ends. Led by Professor John Coffee's agency cost scholarship,
economic theory illuminated some of the problems with private securities
litigation. The discussion focused on how agency cost issues drove many of
the problems.8 While a complete discussion of agency cost dynamics is
beyond my scope here, agency costs arise in all principal-agent relationships
and "consist of (1) the costs of monitoring the agent, (2) the costs the agent
incurs to advertise or guarantee his fidelity ('bonding' costs), and (3) the
residual costs of opportunistic behavior that is not cost-efficient to
prevent."" In the class action context, a common agency cost problem is the
sweetheart settlement in which the plaintiffs' attorney increases her fee award
at the cost of the plaintiffs' recovery.
Agency cost theories explained why many class action plaintiffs in the
pre-PSLRA era did not closely monitor their counsel. 9 For example, a lead
plaintiff with a mere $26 in losses has little incentive to monitor her counsel
closely. To sum up the extent of the problem, consider one plaintiffs'
lawyer's provocative boast, "I have the greatest practice of law in the world. I
have no clients."90
Agency cost problems may also drive over-enforcement of the securities
laws. Over-enforcement issues arise when the plaintiffs' counsel would
litigate to secure fees and payment even though the litigation would not be in
the plaintiffs' long-term interest.91 Litigation, although profitable for the
plaintiffs' counsel, might work against shareholders' interests if it would make
the companies sued too risk averse in the future. For example, if private
so-called "holder" claims. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40
(1975).
86 For a description of Coffee's impact on the debate, see Rose, supra note 54, at 1317.
87 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987).
88 Id.
89 Id.; Pritchard, supra note 68, at 949 ("As a practical matter, plaintiffs' lawyers face little
scrutiny of their performance on behalf of their nominal clients .... ).
90 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (quoting William
P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, FORBES, October 11, 1993 (quoting William Lerach)).
91 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plainft's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theorfor
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681
(1986).
320 Virginia Law & Business Review 9:305 (2015)
litigation invariably followed stock drops, companies might hesitate to take
risks.
D. The PSLRA Imposes Procedural Barriers
Aiming to protect the national securities markets from "abusive and
meritless suits" and to address agency cost issues, Congress passed the
PSLRA in 1995 to reform private securities class actions. 92 The PSLRA
sought to improve private enforcement of Rule lOb-5 by creating a "separate
subset of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that applies only to securities
fraud cases."93 Among other changes, the PSLRA responded to defendants'
concerns by: (1) imposing the "strong inference" standard, making it much
more difficult for groundless actions to survive motions to dismiss; and (2)
creating a discovery stay, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to secure
discovery. 94
Of course, the PSLRA's significant alterations to the rules of civil
procedure also raised the fear that otherwise meritorious actions would not be
able to overcome these barriers. President Clinton initially vetoed the bill on
the concern that "the pleading requirements ... with regard to a defendant's
state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims
being heard in Federal courts."95
The legislation passed over President Clinton's veto and its new measures
significantly altered the landscape for private securities litigation, creating
significant challenges for plaintiffs. As other scholars have exhaustively
explored the PSLRA, 96 I only address three of the PSLRA's key provisions
here for context.
92 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprnted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
93 Perino, supra note 1, at 292.
94 For a discussion of the new provisions, see id. at 288-98.
9s 141 CONG. REC. S19,034, 19,035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (President's message to the
House of Representatives returning without approval the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act).
96 See, eg, John W. Avery, Securities Ltigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private
Securities Utgation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996); Michael A. Perino, Did the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913 (2003); Joel Seligman,
The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 717 (1996).
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1. The Strong Inference Standard
Perhaps the PSLRA's most controversial provision, the strong inference
standard imposes a new pleading requirement designed to make it easier for
courts to dismiss unfounded fraud allegations.97 The standard applies to both
class and individual actions and requires plaintiffs to surmount a high bar. To
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiffs complaint must: (1) specify which
statements were misleading and the reasons why each statement was
misleading; (2) state "with particularity all facts on which [any pleading made
upon information and] belief is formed;" and (3) "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind."98
Judicial interpretation has confirmed that this pleading standard
substantially exceeds ordinary notice pleading requirements. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the standard as requiring that courts "take into account
plausible opposing inferences" and only deny a motion to dismiss under the
PSLRA "if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the
facts alleged."99 Although the circuit courts continue to diverge in the ways in
which they apply the strong inference standard, the PSLRA's heightened
pleading standard has made it more likely that a court will grant a motion to
dismiss in a securities fraud case.100
The ordinary rules of civil procedure are more lenient. Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely obligates the plaintiff to make a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."101 While Rule 9(b) requires that pleadings alleging fraud provide a bit
more detail, it only obligates the plaintiff to allege the circumstances of fraud
with some particularity while allowing allegations of "[m]alice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of . . . mind" to be averred generally. 102
97 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
98 Id.
99 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323-24 (2007).
1oo Statistical analysis reveals that a higher percentage of securities fraud actions are being
dismissed than before the PSLRA. For the Ninth Circuit, while the pre-PSLRA dismissal
rate stood at "20.8 percent, it climbed to 34.9 percent by 2003, and in 2005, it stood at
57.1 percent. This suggests that the pleading standard matters, and likely a lot." James D.
Cox et al., Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?:
Doctrinal and EmnpiricalAnalyses, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 421, 442 (2009).
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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Without the PSLRA, a plaintiff would merely need only to establish a
"plausible" entitlement to relief to survive a motion to dismiss.103
2. The DiscoveU Stay
In addition to a heightened pleading standard, the PSLRA also stays
litigation discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiSS.104 This
means that plaintiffs cannot seek information from the defendants to support
their complaints until they prevail on a motion to dismiss. By including this
provision, Congress sought to reduce plaintiffs' ability to extort settlements
by saddling defendants with costly discovery obligations. 10
The PSLRA's discovery stay interacts with the strong inference pleading
standard to effectively choke many federal securities actions to death. As
Professor Geoffrey Miller and others have recognized, the "intersection of
[the PSLRA's] rules puts a plaintiff in a vise: the pleading rules require
particularized allegations and a strong inference of scienter, while the
discovery stay deprives the attorney of the conventional means to develop
this information."106 In short, the PSLRA makes it extraordinarily difficult
for plaintiffs to obtain enough information to show that they ought to be able
to survive a motion to dismiss.
3. The Lead PlaintifProvision
With the "lead plaintiff' provision, Congress hoped to induce plaintiffs'
counsel to pay closer attention to their clients' interests. In a provision
designed to address agency cost issues, the PSLRA mandated that the
investor or group of investors with the largest claim would become the "lead
plaintiff' with the ability to select class counsel.107 Assigning the largest
stakeholder as the lead plaintiff appealed to reformers because they believed
that having more at stake would cause the lead plaintiff to monitor class
counsel more closely.108
103 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). One limited exception to the stay exists.
Courts may permit "particularized discovery" if "necessary to preserve evidence or to
prevent undue prejudice to" the moving party. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(C).
105 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731 (explaining that the discovery stay serves to "prevent unnecessary imposition of
discovery costs on defendants").
106 Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 507, 530 (2009).
107 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3).
10s See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 83, at 2105-06.
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In the language of corporate governance, this lead plaintiff provision may
be understood as seeking to maximize investors' "voice."109 Much of this
language comes from Harvard economist Albert 0. Hirschman's seminal
book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.1 10 Hirschman defined voice as "any attempt at
all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs,
whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly
in charge, [or] through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of
forcing a change in management.""
Despite the high hopes for this voice provision to change the
management of securities class actions, some judges have gone to
"considerable lengths to nullify this power to select class counsel." 112 Still,
some evidence indicates that the presence of institutional lead plaintiffs does
lead to slightly larger settlement recoveries for the class.' 3 Despite this, it
also appears that investors may be recovering a smaller percentage of their
losses than in the pre-PSLRA era. 114
E. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act
Continuing the trend toward expanded federal oversight and
responsibility for the national securities markets, Congress adopted the
National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) and amended
the Securities Act to preempt most state Blue Sky laws.115 At a time when
significant federal powers had been devolved to state control, NSMIA
109 Coffee, supra note 10, at 408-09.
110 ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
111 Id. at 30.
112 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litzgation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 414 (2000) (discussing limited application
of lead plaintiff provision).
113 SeeJames D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Does the PlaintiffMatter? An EnpiricalAnalysis of Lead
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006) (finding that while
settlement size has not increased, the presence of an institutional investor as a lead
plaintiff increases the dollar amount of settlements).
114 Id. at 1637.
1s Pub. L. No. 104-290 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §5 772-3, 78mm, 80b-3a
(2012)); Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001)
("The primary purpose of NSMIA was to preempt state 'Blue Sky' laws which required
issuers to register many securities with state authorities prior to marketing in the state.");
H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920, 3920
[hereinafter "Conference Report"]; H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3877-80.
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charted a different course-toward increased federal control.116 In his signing
statement, President Clinton praised the legislation as "the most significant
overhaul of the securities regulatory structure in decades" and stated that it
would "enhance capital formation and the competitiveness of the American
economy by eliminating regulatory overlap between the States and the Federal
Government, significantly rationalizing [and] simplifying the way mutual
funds and corporate securities are regulated.""
NSMIA amended the federal securities laws in significant ways and
stripped states of substantial power. It amended Section 18 of the Securities
Act to exempt "covered securities" from any "law rule, regulation, or order,
or other administrative action of any State or any political subdivision
thereof."' The statute defines covered securities broadly as, among other
things, securities "listed, or authorized for listing" on national securities
exchanges; securities issued by federally registered investment companies; and
securities sold to qualified purchasers.119
Despite these broad exemptions, NSMIA also preserved certain state
powers. Most notably, to ensure investor protection, it specifically preserved
the rights of state securities regulators "to investigate and bring enforcement
actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a broker or
dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions."1 2 0
As it focused on state regulatory requirements, NSMIA did not address
private rights of action. Indeed, no evidence indicates "Congress was
concerned by state court jurisdiction over conventional securities fraud
claims, or had any intent to preempt state statutory or common law causes of
action for conventional securities fraud." 121
F. The PSLRA Triggers Forum Shifting
In a now-familiar narrative, many plaintiffs evaded the PSLRA by walking
out of federal court and into state court where the PSLRA's procedural
limitations did not apply. 122 Although relatively few securities fraud class
116 See Perino, supra note 1, at 274-77.
117 PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON, STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3923.
118 15 U.S.C. 5 77r(a).
119 Id. § 77r(b).
120 Id. § 77r(c).
121 Affidavit of Professor Donald C. Langevoort (July 18, 2001), available at 2001 WL
34897554.
122 Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[M]any
class action plaintiffs avoided the stringent procedural hurdles erected by PSLRA by
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actions had been filed in state court before the PSLRA, post-PSLRA a
significant volume of cases simply shifted away from federal to state courts. 1 2 3
A few years after passing the PSLRA, Congress considered statistical analysis
of securities class action filing trends authored by Professors Joseph A.
Grundfest and Michael A. Perino. They found that securities class action
filings had "declined by about a third in federal courts, but that there has been
an almost equal increase in the level of state court activity, largely as a result
of a 'substitution effect' whereby plaintiffs resort to state court to avoid the
new, more stringent requirements of federal cases." 124
Moving actions from federal to state court involved significant tradeoffs
for plaintiffs. Suits under state law could not ordinarily benefit from the
fraud-on-the-market presumption as they could with a Rule lOb-5 action.
Despite this, plaintiffs opted to press similar claims under state law because
they could still secure substantial damages.
By litigating in state court, plaintiffs regained many of the rights the
PSLRA restricted. 125 Still, flight from the federal forum raised a number of
policy concerns. The PSLRA was enacted to reduce the cost of raising capital
by limiting supposedly abusive litigation.126 The PSLRA could not achieve
this goal if plaintiffs circumvented its limitations by filing class actions in state
court.
bringing suit in state rather than federal court."); see also Perino, supra note 1, at 294-95
("This pleading standard, and some courts' strict interpretations of it, create incentives for
plaintiffs to file certain categories of cases in state court, where the higher pleading
standards do not apply.").
123 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006) ("Rather than
face the obstacles set in their path . . . , plaintiffs . . . began bringing class actions under
state law, often in state court. The evidence presented to Congress . .. suggested that this
phenomenon was a novel one; state-court litigation of class actions involving nationally
traded securities had previously been rare.").
124 H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998) (citing Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A.
Perino, Securities Lit gation Reform: The First Year's Experience: A Statistical and LegalAnal'ysis of
Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 140, 1997), avai/ab/e at
https://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/securities-litigation-reform-the-first-years-
experience-a-statistical-and-legal-analysis-of-class-action-securities).
125 See Perino, supra note 1, at 292-93 (explaining that the PSLRA "sets the stage for
plaintiffs' attorneys to shift some portion of their cases to state court in order to avoid"
the PSLRA's restrictions).
126 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
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G. SLUSA's Broad Preclusion & Operation
In 1998, Congress decided that the national interest in regulating the
national securities markets justified precluding state law class action claims. 127
By taking state law class actions away, Congress hoped to bring securities
litigation back to federal court. Aimed at promoting the uniform adjudication
of securities fraud actions and destroying most state law securities fraud class
actions, SLUSA precludes (1) statutorily defined class actions that: (2) assert
state-law claims; (3) involve a nationally listed security; and (4) allege an
untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of that security. 128
SLUSA's allocation of authority over class actions closely tracks the
allocation of authority between state and federal securities regulation in
NSMIA.129 Both statutes seek to address securities that are "inherently
national in nature" and both use the term "covered securities" to describe
these national market securities. 1 0 Congress intended that SLUSA would
"work in concert with the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996 (NSMIA)" and borrowed many of SLUSA's provisions from NSMIA. 131
SLUSA grants defendants tremendous power. When SLUSA applies to a
state court action, defendants may either ask the state court to dismiss the
action entirely as precluded by SLUSA or they may remove it to federal court
and ask the federal court to dismiss the action as precluded by SLUSA. 13 2
After applying SLUSA, many courts will dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims
127 H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 8-9 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3-5 (1998).
128 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f(1). See also Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 552
(6th Cir. 2011); Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.)
(summarizing SLUSA's scope). To define "covered securities," SLUSA draws from
NSMIA's amendments to the Securities Act and defines "covered securities" broadly as
including nationally traded securities listed or authorized for listing on specified national
exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f(5)(E). Notably, the broad definition of covered securities
also sweeps in certain unlisted securities if the issuer has issued covered securities. Id.
SLUSA also contains a carve-out for derivative actions, known informally as the
"Delaware carve-out." This provision provides that "a private party may bring a covered
class action 'based upon the statutory or common law of the State in which the issuer is
incorporated (in the case of a corporation) or organized (in the case of any other entity)."'
Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing 15 U.S.C. §
77p(d)(1)(A)).
129 See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001).
130 H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 40 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920,
3921.
131 Lander, 251 F.3d at 108.
132 IKircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 646 (2006) (explaining that state courts
may also dismiss state court actions precluded by SLUSA).
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with prejudice-destroying any ability to replead claims differently to escape
SLUSA's preclusive effect.133
While SLUSA prohibits many state law class actions, the statute does not
preempt state law and only partially nationalizes securities litigation involving
national market securities. Although often misleadingly described as a general
preemption statute, the Supreme Court has stated, "SLUSA does not actually
pre-empt any state cause of action. It simply denies plaintiffs the right to use
the class-action device to vindicate certain claims." 1 34
Yet, understanding SLUSA's extensive scope requires a close
understanding of how courts interpret the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of covered securities." To show the current range of federal
limitations, I first discuss the "in connection with" phrase in relation to the
Commission's enforcement jurisdiction before discussing issues with indirect
investments into national market securities and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Troice.
1. The Scope of SLUSA's Preclusive Effect
SLUSA's breadth and harsh preclusion provision have generated
substantial litigation.135 One of SLUSA's most heavily litigated issues is how
broadly courts should extend SLUSA's reach to protect the national securities
markets from vexatious litigation.136 In relevant part, the statute provides that
SLUSA applies to covered class actions alleging "an untrue statement or
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security."1 37 The statute does not define the term "in connection
with," and substantial controversy has developed over how strong a
connection to national market securities must exist before courts may apply
SLUSA. Judicial interpretation of SLUSA's "in connection with" requirement
133 See, e.g., Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 556.
134 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006). In Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust, the Court further explained that SLUSA's "preclusion provision is
often called a preemption provision; the Act, however, does not itself displace state law
with federal law but makes some state-law claims nonactionable through the class-action
device in federal as well as state court." 547 U.S. at 636 n.1.
135 See In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 265 (D.N.H. 2007) ("For
holder claimants like the Blocks, who have no remedy under federal law, this is a harsh
result, but the law is clear on this point.").
136 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, The End of the Vexatiousness Rationale, 41 SEC. REG. L.J.
(2013). Professor Couture describes the "vexatiousness rationale" as a "policy heuristic"
that operates "as a shorthand reason to limit the scope of securities fraud liability." Id.
137 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1).
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also necessarily touches on the scope of the "in connection with" requirement
in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. " The provisions are nearly
identical-with one difference. Section 10(b) applies to conduct in
connection with all securities transactions, while SLUSA only applies to
transactions in connection with national market securities.
Adding to the complexity, the private right of action arising under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 has been interpreted more narrowly than the
Commission's public enforcement jurisdiction premised on the same statute
and rule. For the Commission's enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court
had interpreted the Exchange Act's "in connection with" requirement broadly
as conferring public enforcement jurisdiction so long as "the scheme to
defraud and the sale of securities coincide." 3 9 Yet the court has been less
expansive in charting the scope of private securities litigation under Rule lOb-
5. In Blue Chia Stamps, the Court imposed a standing requirement and barred
plaintiffs from litigating so-called "holder claims" under Rule 10b-5, limiting
the private right of action to plaintiffs who actually purchased or sold
securities. 140 The Court imposed these limitations on private securities
litigation because of concerns that private suits by persons who had not
purchased or sold the securities at issue presented a special risk of vexatious
litigation.141 As similar concerns were not present with public enforcement,
the Supreme Court did not similarly limit the Commission's reach.142
The scope of SLUSA's "in connection with" requirement first reached
the Supreme Court in Merrill Lnch, Pierce, Fenner & Smitj, Inc. v. Dabit.143 The
case involved a class action brought by Merrill Lynch brokers claiming that
Merrill Lynch had violated state law by providing its brokers with "misleading
research." 144 These misleading research reports purportedly caused the
brokers to both mislead their clients and to continue to personally hold
securities that they would have sold had they known the truth. 145 To avoid
SLUSA and maintain the securities class action under state law, the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to specifically focus on "holders" and exclude as
potential class members "claimants who purchased in connection with the
138 Cf IBP Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) ("[I]dentical words used in different parts
of the same statute are ... presumed to have the same meaning.").
139 SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002).
140 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
141 Id. at 740.
142 A similar limitation would also make little sense for the Commission's enforcement
jurisdiction because the Commission does not ordinarily purchase securities itself.
143 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
144 Id. at 75.
145 Id
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fraud and who therefore could meet the standing requirement" for a private
Rule lOb-5 action. 146 After structuring their action this way, the class action
plaintiffs argued that the Court should interpret SLUSA as inapplicable to
state law claims not involving purchasers or sellers because they could not be
litigated in a Rule lOb-5 action.147
The Supreme Court rejected this strict purchaser/seller requirement and
found that SLUSA precluded the action. In interpreting SLUSA's "in
connection with" requirement, the Supreme Court traced the history of the
PSLRA and SLUSA. It recognized that Congress had been concerned about
"abuses of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally traded
securities" when it enacted the PSLRA.148 It also noted that Congress
enacted SLUSA to limit private securities class actions in state courts because
the PSLRA could not achieve its intended purposes if plaintiffs could easily
avoid it by filing class actions in state courts. 1 4 9
Deciding on an interpretation in line with these concerns, the Court
found that SLUSA's preclusive scope extended broadly, much like the
Commission's enforcement jurisdiction. It found that SLUSA's preclusion
provision encompassed even actions where the federal private right of action
did not reach, effectively extinguishing state law class action claims even when
the plaintiffs lack a remedy under federal law.15 0 It interpreted the statute's
"in connection with" requirement as satisfied so long as any "fraud alleged
'coincide[d]' with a securities transaction-whether by the plaintiff or by
someone else."15 1 Thus, the Supreme Court seemingly extended SLUSA's
preclusion to match the Commission's enforcement jurisdiction-and
precluded state law class action claims so long as nationally traded securities
were somehow involved.
The Court's decision to interpret SLUSA broadly may be viewed as part
of the trend toward allocating regulatory power over national securities
markets to the federal government. While NSMIA had preempted state
registration requirements for covered securities, SLUSA followed in the same
vein and precluded private state law class action liability. In deciding Dabit,
the Court explicitly trumpeted the federal interest in regulating the national
146 Id at 77.
147 Id
148 Id at 81.
149 Id. at 82.
150 See In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 265 (D.N.H. 2007)
(explaining that SLUSA extinguishes state law class action claims even though it denies
"any remedy at all to certain classes of plaintiffs").
151 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006).
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securities markets when it emphatically stated that "[t]he magnitude of the
federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficient operation of the
market for nationally traded securities cannot be overstated."1 5 2
2. Indirect Investments in National Market Securities
Although the Court had directed a broad interpretation of SLUSA's "in
connection with" requirement, courts began to split over whether to preclude
state law claims when some of the securities at issue do not meet the statutory
definition of "covered securities," such as in cases where uncovered securities
allow purchasers to invest indirectly in covered securities.153 This issue came
into focus in the fracas over whether to apply SLUSA in Bernard Madoff-
related cases.
The broad outlines of Madoffs Ponzi scheme are well-known. Madoff
ran a broker-dealer and told his customers that he used a "split-strike
conversion" strategy to invest their assets in nationally traded securities. 154
Madoffs largest customers were so-called "feeder funds," which provided
conduits for investors to place their money with Madoff. 155 By buying
securities issued by feeder funds, investors sought to gain exposure to
Madoffs purported purchases and sales of national market securities.
Because Madoff exploited prices from national market securities and falsely
claimed to be making investments in national market securities, most courts
applied SLUSA. 15
Yet courts have split over the indirect ownership issue. For example, in
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., the district court considered whether SLUSA
applied to preclude class action claims against a fund that had invested its
assets in the Madoff Ponzi scheme.157 While Madoff had falsely represented
that he traded covered securities, the court was concerned that the interests
sold by the funds were not themselves covered securities and not closely
related enough to "whatever phantom securities Madoff purported to be
152 Id at 78.
153 See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
750 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding SLUSA inapplicable to claims
involving the non-covered securities of a fund which invested its assets in covered
securities).
154 Barron v. Igolnikov, No. 09 Civ. 4471(TPG), 2010 WL 882890, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2010) (stating Ponzi scheme's "well-known" facts).
155 Id
156 Id. at *5.
157 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 398-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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purchasing." 5 8 Ruling that stretching SLUSA to encompass these claims
would snap "even the most flexible rubber band," it declined to preclude the
plaintiffs' state law claims.15 9 Still, most courts applied the "in connection
with" requirement more broadly and precluded state law class action claims if
plaintiffs attempted to purchase covered securities either directly or
indirectly.16 0
Despite unanimously extolling the national interest in overseeing the
securities markets in Dabit, the Supreme Court later split over SLUSA's reach
in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice.16 1 The case involved Allen Stanford's
Ponzi scheme. 16 2 Stanford sold high interest certificates of deposit (CDs)
supposedly backed by lucrative assets, purportedly including covered
securities.' A bank chartered in Antigua issued the CDs that were not
covered securities. 16 4 The defendants attempted to link these bogus CDs to
national market securities by pointing out that Stanford had claimed to
purchase covered securities with the monies raised through selling the CDs.16 s
In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the majority focused on the
attenuated connection to nationally traded securities. Finding the relationship
to national market securities too remote because the plaintiffs were not
attempting to purchase any direct or indirect interest in nationally traded
securities, the Court attempted to draw a line. It held that a "fraudulent
misrepresentation or omission is not made 'in connection with' such a
'purchase or sale of a covered security' unless it is material to a decision by
one or more individuals (other than the fraudster) to buy or to sell a 'covered
security."'16 6
The Court's delicate language here warrants further scrutiny. The Court
did not say that the plaintiff had to buy covered securities.16 7 Alternatively
phrased, the decision states that SLUSA precludes state law class action
158 Id. at 398.
159 Id. at 399.
160 See, e.g., In re Herald, 730 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2013).
161 Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014).
162 Id. at 1059.
163 Id. at 1064.
164 Id. at 1068.
165 Id. at 1065.
166 Id. at 1066.
167 Ann M. Lipton, The Troice Cases-Questions Answered and Unanswered, Bus. L. PROF BLOG
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://awprofessors.typepad.com/business_1aw/2014/03/the-troice-
cases-questions-answered-and-unanswered.html.
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claims whenever the misrepresentation or omission affects someone other than
the fraudster's decision to attempt to buy or sell a covered security.16 8
What this means about the necessary connection to national market
securities remains unclear. 169 Because the Court left Dabit's holding
untouched, it cannot be read as limiting SLUSA preclusion to instances where
the "plaintifvictim of the scheme . . . decide[d] whether to buy or sell based on
the misrepresentation." 170 In Dabit, which the Court reaffirmed, the broker
plaintiffs had explicitly disavowed any claim premised on their purchases or
sales of securities.' They sought damages for business lost because of
misleading research reports. Although the brokers were upset about lost
business, the misrepresentations at issue had affected decisions about trading
national market securities, thus falling within SLUSA's preclusive scope.
The Court's rationale in Troice may guide SLUSA's application when a
misrepresentation or omission will sufficiently relate to the buying or selling
of national market securities. The Court insisted that the relevant
misrepresentation's or omission's connection to national market securities
must be "a connection that matters."1 7 2 Expounding on this phrase, the
Court broadly defined connections that matter as "where the
misrepresentation makes a significant difference to someone's decision to purchase
or to sell a covered security, not to purchase or to sell an uncovered security,
something about which the Act expresses no concern."173
Extending SLUSA preclusion to any misrepresentations or omissions
affecting transactions in national market securities seemingly also precludes
many state law class action claims involving uncovered securities. Consider,
for example, the facts in U.S. Mortgage, Inc. v. Saxton.17 4 There, the plaintiffs
had relied on the defendant's false public securities filings when making loans
to the defendant.' The plaintiffs extended ordinary loans after reviewing
information about the business, including information contained in the
defendant's public securities filings. The plaintiffs alleged that they would not
have made the loans had the defendant's securities filing disclosed its "true
financial condition."176 Even though the loans were not covered securities,
168 Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (2014).
169 See Lipton, supra note 167.
170 Id
171 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 76, 103 (2006).
172 Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1066.
173 Id. (emphasis added).
174 494 F.3d 833, 836-39 (9th Cir. 2007).
175 Id. at 837.
176 Id. at 839.
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the Ninth Circuit barred the plaintiffs' state law class action claims because
"the alleged harm stems from misrepresentations in [the defendant's] public
filings and public statements [and because t]hese misrepresentations
undoubtedly 'coincide' with the purchase or sale of . . . 'covered securities'
under SLUSA." 177
This interpretation aligns with the Court's Troice decision. 178 The
misrepresentations and omissions about the defendant's financial condition
affected decisions to buy or sell national market securities as well as the loans
made by the plaintiffs.7 9 As the misrepresentations affected decisions of
persons other than the fraudster, i.e. the fraudster's shareholders, the Ninth
Circuit's decision appears to be good law, even though the victims of the
defendant's misrepresentation were not attempting to purchase national
market securities.
Yet what about misrepresentations about uncovered securities
supposedly backed by national market securities? The Court seemingly held
the door open for SLUSA to preclude most indirect claims touching on the
national securities markets when it emphasized that prior cases had met the
nexus requirement when victims of a misrepresentation or omission
attempted to buy or sell "an ownershfo interest in [relevant] financial
instruments." 1s0 As the dissent pointed out, "[b]y using the term ownership
interest instead of ownership," the Court apparently accepted "that indirect
ownership . . . suffic[es] in certain circumstances." 181 Thus,
misrepresentations or omissions inducing an investor to attempt to take an
indirect ownership position in national market securities by purchasing
uncovered securities would seemingly meet the requirement.
Where does the law on indirect ownership stand now? As discussed
above, Madoff proves a clear example of indirect investment into a fraud
involving representations about national market securities. Most courts
considering the issue before Troice found that SLUSA precluded state law
claims because Madoff claimed to be purchasing and selling covered
securities. 18 2 After Troice, that conclusion appears unchanged. In a recent
177 Id. at 845.
178 See Lipton, supra note 167.
179 Saxton, 494 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2007).
1so Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (2014).
181 Id. at 1080 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182 See, e.g, In re Herald, Primeo & Thema Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 289(RMB), 2011 WL
5928952, at *5-9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011); In re Merkin, 817 F. Supp. 2d 346, 359-61
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); In rej.P. Jeanneret Assoc's., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 340, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Wolf Living Trust v. FM Mutli-Strategy Inv. Fund, L.P., No. 09 Civ. 1540(LBS),
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decision, the Second Circuit applied SLUSA preclusion, finding that "a
plaintiff in Troice was entirely distinguishable from 'a victim who took, tried to
take, or maintained an ownership position in the statutorily relevant securities
through 'purchases' or 'sales' induced by the fraud."'183 In contrast, the
plaintiffs in Troice "were not seeking, directly or indirectly, to purchase
covered securities"; rather, they sought to purchase certificates of deposit that
did not give them an indirect ownership interest in covered securities. 18 4 The
Court's language in Troice buttresses this conclusion, as it emphasized that the
Bank promised that it "would use the victims' money to buyfor itself shares of
covered securities."1 85
Noting the need to balance power between state and federal securities
regulation in Troice, the Court also expressed concern about overly limiting
state authority."' It claimed that a broader interpretation "would interfere
with state efforts to provide remedies for victims of ordinary state-law
frauds." 87 By way of example, it argued that interpreting SLUSA any more
broadly would potentially "prohibit, a lawsuit brought by creditors of a small
business that falsely represented it was creditworthy, in part because it owns
or intends to own exchange-traded stock." 188
In contrast, the dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by
Justice Alito, focused on the need to protect federal control over regulating
the national securities markets.1 9 Justice Kennedy worried that the Court's
narrower interpretation would "undermine the primacy of federal law in
policing abuses in the securities markets."190 Approaching the issue from a
national policy perspective, Justice Kennedy contended that "state-law
litigation will drive up legal costs for market participants and the secondary
actors, such as lawyers, accountants, brokers, and advisers, who seek to rely
2010 WL 4457322, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2010); Newman v. Family Mgmt. Corp., 748
F. Supp. 2d 299, 311-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Beacon Assoc's. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d
386, 429-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Barron v. Igolnikov, No. 09 Civ. 4471(TPG), 2010 WL
882890, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2010).
183 In re Herald, 753 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1067).
184 Id
185 Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1071.
186 Id. at 1060.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1068.
189 See id. at 1073.
190 Id. at 1074.
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on the stability that results from a national securities market regulated by
federal law." 191
The dispute between the majority and the dissent in Troice may be
understood as the latest round in the long-running controversy over the
proper allocation of authority over securities liability between state and
federal law. While the majority endeavored to preserve state law liability for
claims not directly involving national market securities, the dissent sought to
encompass more disputes as involving national securities. 192
H. SLUSA Precludes Most State Law Claims in Federal Court
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted SLUSA's "in
connection with" provision, the practical operation of its class action
definition provision has not received as much attention.193 The definition
extends broadly and includes a "group of lawsuits" provision that allows
courts to combine individual suits into class actions. 194 Because SLUSA
preclusion extends to actions falling within this "group of lawsuits" provision,
its interpretation takes on critical importance.
Under today's dominant interpretation, plaintiffs' counsel must be
increasingly wary of SLUSA's group of lawsuits provision and, by extension,
federal court. The provision effectively banishes many state law claims from
federal court because it requires courts to reclassify individual actions-based
on the facts alleged in other actions-as class actions. Whenever this happens,
individual plaintiffs find that they may not assert favorable state law claims.
1. The Group of Lawsuits Provision
SLUSA's definition of covered class actions sweeps broadly and includes
three different ways to identify covered class actions.195 The first two
definitions are intuitive. First, SLUSA precludes any action under state law
191 Id.
192 The dissent also voiced concerns about how the Court's opinion would impact the
Commission's enforcement jurisdiction under 10(b). I put this issue to the side here. See
id.
193 Although focused on class actions permitted under the Delaware Carve-Out, Professor
Johnson has recognized that SLUSA has been applied repeatedly to individual suits
proceeding in the same courts. SeeJohnson, supra note 6, at 354-55.
194 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).
19s Id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B).
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where the plaintiff characterizes her own complaint as a class action.196
Second, SLUSA also takes effect whenever "damages are sought on behalf of
more than 50 persons." 197
SLUSA's third covered class action definition extends more broadly to
encompass certain groups of lawsuits coordinated or consolidated in the same
court. 198 The Eleventh Circuit articulated four elements for SLUSA's "group
of lawsuits" provision: "(1) a 'group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the
same court;' (2) 'common questions of law or fact;' (3) 'damages are sought
on behalf of more than 50 persons;' and (4) 'the lawsuits are joined,
consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose."'199
When these elements are met, courts will generally classify the lawsuits as part
of a "covered class action" under SLUSA. 200
2. The Group of Lawsuits Provision in Federal Court
This "group of lawsuits" provision already prevents the litigation of many
individual state law claims in federal courts. Significant securities
controversies often spawn sprawling individual and class action litigation in
both state and federal courts. 2 0 1 Once a sufficient number of related cases
enter the federal pipeline, SLUSA flushes them out of court. This happens
because federal court procedures allow defendants to combine individual
actions together in ways that place them within SLUSA's group of lawsuits
provision. 202
Quite possibly, Congress did not intend to preclude all individual claims
within the federal court system. 203 Instead, Congress likely overlooked how
196 Id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(II).
197 Id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(I).
198 Id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).
199 Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)) (concluding "that this case is part of a 'group of
lawsuits' covered by SLUSA").
200 Id
201 See, eg, In re Residential Capital, LLC, No. 12-12020, 2013 WL 3286198, at *9 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013) ("Many purchasers of [residential mortgage backed securities]
have brought claims in state and federal courts against Credit Suisse and Ally Securities,
among other underwriters, claiming violations of federal and state securities laws and
common-law causes of action.").
202 As explained in detail below, SLUSA's group-of-lawsuits provision includes individual
actions forcibly consolidated with a class action. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 11 Civ. 3827 (SHS), 2013 WL 6569875 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2013).
203 Simply preempting all individual securities fraud claims would have been substantially
simpler.
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courts would implement SLUSA's provisions, extending its long history of
incoherent lawmaking in this area. 204
Although possibly unintended, a massive shift in the balance of state and
federal power has already occurred. Despite this quiet shift to increased
limitations on individual state law claims, the sky has not fallen. Further
extending it to many state law claims within state courts seems likely to
generate more benefits than harms.
In the two different factual scenarios described below, SLUSA already
effectively nationalizes many individual state law securities fraud claims,
shifting regulatory power over these securities disputes from dual state and
federal oversight toward federal enforcement. These outcomes exist in
tension with the Supreme Court's declaration in Dabit that SLUSA "does not
deny any individual plaintiff, or indeed any group of fewer than 50 plaintiffs,
the right to enforce any state-law cause of action that may exist." 205
I. The MDL Process Nationalizes State Law Claims in Federal Court
For securities suits in federal court, SLUSA's limited preclusion
frequently expands into full preemption through the multi-district litigation
(MDL) process. 206 The MDL process provides a mechanism for defendants
to transfer civil actions involving similar legal and factual issues to a single
court (the MDL Court) for consolidated or coordinated pretrial
proceedings. 207 Overseeing this process, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
204 Thomas Lee Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts for Private
Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C. L. REV. 707, 709 (1982) (discussing
inconsistent jurisdictional provisions and noting that the discrepancies may have resulted
from "unfortunate legislative apathy or inattention"); Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the
Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rihts ofAction Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U.
L. REV. 621, 625 (2006) ("Given the obvious shortcomings of SLUSA, however, this
exemption begs the question: what exactly does Congress intend its jurisdictional
'framework' for securities claims to be?"). As Professor Amanda Rose has observed,
"[The current environment] is more the product of historical happenstance than coherent
design choices." Rose, supra note 50, at 2175.
205 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006); but see In re
Enron Corp. Sec., 535 F.3d 325, 336 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying SLUSA preclusion despite
argument that "federal courts will be able to manufacture SLUSA preemption by issuing
consolidation orders").
206 In re BP Sec., Derivative & Emp't Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d
1380, 1383 (J.P.M.L. 2010) ("We have frequently included securities and ERISA actions in
one MDL docket."). For a discussion of issues associated with multi-district litigation in
both state and federal courts, see Glover, supra note 24. As Professor Glover's Article
succinctly summarizes the MDL process, I track her explanation below.
207 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
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Litigation JPML), a panel of federal judges, evaluates whether transfer will
serve "the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions." 208 The JPML may transfer any federal court action
to the MDL Court on its own initiative or at the motion of any party.209 The
JPML has the power to transfer the entire action or to "separate any claim,
cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such
claims" to the originating federal court. 210 After completing pre-trial
proceedings, the MDL Court must, unless the parties agree otherwise, return
the action to the originating court for trial. 2 1 1 In practice, however, few cases
return to the originating court because the pretrial proceedings in the MDL
Court usually result in a settlement. 212
The federal MDL process stretches SLUSA's state law class action claim
preclusion to apply to individual state law claims by rearranging actions so
that they fall within SLUSA's "group of lawsuits" provision. 213 Courts
interpreting SLUSA's "group of lawsuits" provision have repeatedly
recognized individual securities actions consolidated through the MDL
process as covered class actions, even though the plaintiff had never intended
to file a class action or coordinate the action with other actions. 214
208 Id
209 Id. § 1407(c).
210 Id. § 1407(a).
211 Id.; see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998)
(holding that the plain reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 prohibited transferee courts from
using 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to avoid transferring MDL cases back to their original courts).
212 E.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.
REv. 265, 270 (2011) (MDL "creates the perfect conditions for an aggregate settlement");
Deborah Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future ofMass Toxic Torts, 26 REv. LITIG. 883,
893 (2007) ("[A]lthough formally intended only to streamline the pretrial process, multi-
districting usually leads to some sort of aggregative disposition."); Deborah R. Hensler,
The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Lit gation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL
L. REv. 883, 894 (2001); Glover, supra note 24, at 8 ("[R]emand [usually] never occurs
because consolidation in the MDL serves to facilitate a global settlement.").
213 See In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No. 08-2757, 2011 WL
2517060, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. June 23, 2011) ("Consolidated cases are considered covered
class actions under SLUSA.").
214 Reviewing cases within the Southern District of New York, where SLUSA's group-of-
lawsuits provision had been applied, the court in Markey v. Citigroup, Inc., 09 MD 2070
SHS, 2013 WL 6728102, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) cited a string of cases:
See, e.g., Amorosa v. Ernst & Young LLP (Amorosa II), 682 F. Supp. 2d 351,
373-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[]his Court holds that an action need not have been
formally joined or consolidated with other actions in order to be a 'covered
class action' and subject to SLUSA's preemption provision."); Amorosa v.
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An example illuminates this Rube Goldberg process. Consider the facts
in Odom v. Morgan Stan/ey Smith Barney, LLC.2 1 5 Morgan Stanley had employed
Wesley Odom "as a financial adviser in its Pensacola, Florida office from
1992 to 2009."216 During that time, Odom accumulated a substantial amount
of Morgan Stanley's equity securities. He continued to hold his stock through
a period when Morgan Stanley allegedly misrepresented its exposure to
residential mortgage backed securities. 217 The market later reacted negatively
to news about Morgan Stanley's mortgage-backed securities holdings and
Odom lost his job.
Odom's case began its journey to class action status as an individual
action in state court. Seeking to recover his losses, Odom filed suit in Florida
state court against his former employer, alleging, among other things, that
Morgan Stanley's misrepresentations about its exposure to mortgage-backed
securities caused him to hold securities he would have otherwise sold. Odom
filed his complaint in a local state court, including both state and federal law
claims. Morgan Stanley removed his case to federal court, permitting the
JPML to transfer it to the Southern District of New York to join pending
multidistrict litigation. Once in New York, the MDL Court found that
Ernst & Young LLP (Amnorosa 1), 672 F. Supp. 2d 493, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
affd sub nomn, Amorosa v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 409 F. App'x 412 (2d Cir.
2011); In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 03 MDL 1529
(LMM), 2010 WL 3528872 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2010) ("The present action is
one of more than 50 actions pending in this district as a multidistrict litigation
in which damages are sought for more than 50 people. It is plainly a covered
class action which cannot be maintained in this or any state court."); In re AOL
Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("[T]he 'individual actions,' once aggregated per SLUSA's instructions, are a
'covered class action' for purpose of SLUSA and are properly subject to the
Act's limitations on mass actions."); Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal, No. 02
Civ. 7377(LAK), 2007 WL 1438753, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007), affd, 293 F.
App'x 815 (2d Cir. 2008) (adopting Report and Recommendation in Gordon
Partners v. Blumenthal, No. 02 Civ. 7377(LAK)(AJP), 2007 WL 431864
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007)); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236,
245-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (ten suits, several of which alleged only individual
claims, were proceeding as a single action when their complaints were virtually
identical and they were consolidated for pretrial purposes in the same court).
Cf In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 644, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(observing that an "MDL proceeding coordinates discovery and other pretrial
proceedings, and the actions in it are accordingly proceeding as a single action
for numerous purposes").
215 In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 987 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
216 Id. at 380.
217 Id. at 380-82.
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SLUSA precluded Odom's state law claims even though Odom never sought
to file a class action and never took any purposeful step toward consolidation
with the MDL Court.2 1 8
The MDL Court did not take into account whether the plaintiff intended
to pursue individual state law claims. 219 It simply applied SLUSA's "group of
lawsuits" provision because the statute does not include any requirement that
an MDL Court consider "any of these factors." 2 20
It remains unclear whether Congress intended this result. To be sure,
simply precluding the litigation of many state law securities fraud claims in
federal court would have been simpler and more efficient. At the least,
Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Johnson foresaw a variation on the problem.
In registering their opposition to SLUSA, they criticized SLUSA's definition
of class actions as "too broad" because it might "include State court actions
brought by separate individual investors, or by groups of public investors
such as school districts or local governments." 2 2 1  In any event, the wisdom
of allowing these cases to proceed under different laws than the class seems
questionable.
Of course, SLUSA does not now preclude federal courts from hearing
every individual state law claim involving national market securities. 222 Some
claims will not fall within its scope. To trigger practical preclusion, the
securities controversy must be large enough and have caused enough
widespread damage to cause a significant number of plaintiffs to sue. Thus,
smaller individual claims, not in connection with a major event might survive
in federal court so long as the overall volume of actions in federal court
remains low.
J. No Exit-An Opt-Out Quirk for Plaintiffs in the Federal System
As Professor Coffee has explained, the rules of "litigation governance" in
actions for money damages require class members to opt out of a class action
settlement if they do not wish for a settlement to bind them.223 But not all
218 Id. at 388.
219 Id
220 Id
221 S. REP. No. 105-182, at 19 (1998).
222 See SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (precluding the assertion of certain statutorily defined class action
claims).
223 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 407 n.2. The right to "opt out" and exit a class action clearly
exists for "class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3)." Id. Even though Rule 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2) does not mandate a right to opt out for class actions certified under those
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persons seeking to opt out enjoy the same rights. Much depends on whether
a federal court has established jurisdiction over them.
Plaintiffs with existing individual actions consolidated with pending
securities class actions fare particularly poorly in federal court. As federal
courts already enjoy jurisdiction over them, these plaintiffs often remain
locked within federal court, unable to pursue their individual state law claims.
This is not merely a hypothetical problem. Within the Second Circuit,
numerous courts have found that plaintiffs may not opt out of a global class
action settlement to pursue individual state law claims because the opt-out
litigation is coordinated with the class action litigation, thus triggering SLUSA
preclusion.224
Consider, for example, SLUSA's application to opt-out plaintiffs in
litigation arising out of the AOL Time Warner merger.225 Approximately two
hundred plaintiffs represented by William Lerach had opted out of the federal
class action. 226 These plaintiffs attempted to avoid SLUSA's reach in federal
court by bringing their claims under the law of different states, with fewer
than fifty plaintiffs seeking relief under any one state's law. 2 27 The court
dismissed their state law claims under SLUSA anyway because their actions
were coordinated into the same court.228
The lesson to be drawn from these precedents? Opt-outs must avoid
federal court if they seek to preserve their state law claims. Once their case
enters the federal system, their state law claims may be dismissed for reasons
wholly outside their control. Importantly, these state law claims were not
dismissed because of any defect in their pleading. Rather, they were
dismissed simply because too many plaintiffs sought to litigate state law
claims. Thus, the right to litigate many state law claims in federal court
remains only so long as fewer than fifty plaintiffs seek relief under state law.
provisions, "most class actions for money damages are certified under Rule 23(b)(3)." Id.
Accordingly, I put questions about these provisions to the side.
224 Amorosa v. Ernst & Young LLP, 672 F. Supp. 2d 493, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), affd sub nomn.,
Amorosa v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 409 F. App'x 412, 417 (2d Cir. 2011) (dismissing
opt-out plaintiffs state law claims); but see Ventura v. AT&T Corp., No. 05 CIV 5718 LLS,
2006 WL 2627979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006) (allowing opt-outs to press state law
claims).
225 Amvorosa, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
226 Id. As explained below, the opt-out trend instigated by William Lerach has continued to
grow. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 311-12 (noting that William Lerach successfully
persuaded over one hundred investors to opt out of federal class actions).
227 In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 666, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
228 Id
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II. AN ACCELERATING TREND TOWARD STATE COURT LITIGATION
AND THE RISE OF DISAGGREGATED CLASSES
Most class actions seeking money damages represent individuals with
negative value claims. 229 An individual claim has negative value when the
litigation costs to bring it would exceed the possible benefit from suit. Class
actions are designed to solve this problem by aggregating negative value
claims, lowering per-claimant costs and making it possible for persons with
negative value claims to recover damages. Class actions also deter misconduct
that scatters harm broadly across many different plaintiffs. 230
Securities class actions differ from other class actions because the
plaintiffs have heterogeneous claims. 2 31 Members of a securities class often
own different amounts of the security. For instance, while an institutional
investor might suffer a multi-million dollar loss, retail investors may have
individually experienced much smaller losses. While many class actions
include predominantly negative value claims, securities class actions include a
range of negative and positive value claims.
The federal securities laws have attempted to use the focused incentive
created by concentrated securities positions to overcome agency cost
problems in federal class action litigation.232 In particular, the PSLRA's lead
plaintiff provision sought to use this heterogeneous claim distribution to
reform the securities class action by making the plaintiff or group of plaintiffs
with the largest stake the presumptive lead plaintiff.233 With a significant
personal stake, the investor with the largest claim seemingly has a strong
incentive to monitor her counsel.
Yet, instead of driving reform, this heterogeneous claim distribution may
now cause the securities class action to unravel as increasing numbers of
plaintiffs opt out of the class device. To put this in context, I first present the
accelerating trend toward opting out of federal class actions before discussing
the rise of disaggregated classes-a new development making it possible for
229 See David Marcus, Making Adequacy More Adequate, 88 TEX. L. REv. 137, 143 (2010)
(discussing negative value claims).
230 See Burch, supra note 2, at 1132 ("[C]lass actions are designed to serve clients with small-
stakes claims or-where cases are economically viable but difficult to litigate effectively
on an individual basis-to amass claims and thereby create a credible threat.").
231 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 314.
232 See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 108, at 2056.
233 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(B)(i).
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plaintiffs' counsel to aggregate negative value claims in state courts without
filing a class action.
A. Institutional Investors Take the Exit Option
As many scholars have noted, increasing numbers of plaintiffs are opting
out of federal securities class actions to pursue individual claims. 234
Institutional investors with the largest positive value claims have led this trend
and captured significantly larger recoveries than they would have received had
they participated in the federal securities class action settlement. 23 5
From both corporate and litigation governance perspectives, the "exit"
option has been praised as a tool for disciplining management and class
counsel, respectively. 23 6 In the corporate governance context, dissatisfied
shareholders "exit" by selling their shares and reducing the stock's market
price allowing the market to hold management accountable. 237
Similarly, in the class action context, opting out allows a plaintiff to
remove the value of his or her claim from the portfolio of claims represented
by class counsel, thus reducing the class action's leverage and class counsel's
potential fee award as fee awards are generally derived from settlement size. 238
The opt-out threat should drive lead counsel to seek better settlements. In
theory, this threat will motivate class counsel because opt-outs may retain
class counsel's rivals to represent them, creating competition and shifting fees
away from class counsel. 239 Defendants often negotiate for "blow
provisions" in class-action settlements that allow them to walk away from a
settlement agreement if a certain percentage of claimants opt out.2 4 0 Because
a blow provision threatens potential settlement and the class counsel's
resulting fee payment, it creates an incentive for class counsel to negotiate for
terms that will keep class members from opting out of the class.
Putting litigation governance issues to the side for now, the economic
incentive for institutional investors to exit federal class actions appears
234 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 311 (explaining that institutional investors are now opting
out "on an unprecedented scale"); Burch, supra note 2, at 1132 (discussing trend toward
opting out).
235 Cf Burch, supra note 2, at 1132.
236 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 308-09.
237 Short-sellers may even borrow shares to use the "exit" option in anticipation of
shareholders exiting.
238 Coffee, supra note 10, at 415-17.
239 Id.
240 See, eg, Nilson v. Prudential Secs. Inc., 107 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision) (noting blow provision).
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reasonably strong. 241 Professor Coffee has recognized opt-outs' superior
performance, explaining that opt-outs' "recovery levels ... dwarf the typical
two to three percent recovery rate in most securities class actions[.]" 242 By
opting out of the AOL Time Warner class action, some institutional investors
achieved recoveries between seven to fifty times better than they would have
received had they remained in the class. 2 43 In at least one instance, opt-outs
may have recovered more funds, overall, than the class action.244
Opt-out actions may enable plaintiffs to recover larger sums than federal
class actions for a variety of procedural and substantive reasons. Some of the
recovery differential may be explained by the inherent advantages that opt-out
litigation will always possess over class action litigation. Another portion of
the disparity may be explained by strategic legal and procedural advantages
opt-out actions currently enjoy over class action litigation.
1. InherentAdvantages
Opt-out actions enjoy significant advantages simply by being more
nimble, individualized actions. To be sure, opt-out actions generally avoid
complex issues and costs associated with class certification issues. 245
Opt-out plaintiffs may also compensate their counsel in ways that deviate
from the payment system for class counsel. For instance, an opt-out plaintiff
with a claim for $500 million in damages may prefer to pay its counsel by the
hour rather than as a percentage of the recovery.
Large institutional investors have at least three additional economic
reasons to opt out of federal securities litigation. 246 First, defendants enjoy
less negotiating leverage in opt-out actions than they have in securities class
actions. While the defendant might threaten to file bankruptcy if the class in
a multi-billion dollar action demands too high a settlement price, this threat
may carry less weight with an institutional investor or other individual opt out
plaintiffs because "no individual opt-out believes that the decision will trigger
bankruptcy." 2 47 Second, most institutional opt-out plaintiffs face lower
241 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 312-13.
242 Id. at 313.
243 Id. at 312-13.
244 Id
245 For evidence of the complexity surrounding the class certification stage in securities
litigation, see Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416-17 (2014)
(discussing "price impact" at the class certification stage).
246 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 316.
247 Id.
9:305 (2015) Disaggregated Classes 345
agency costs because they select and may fire their counsel at will. Third,
large institutional investors may enjoy special leverage in settlement
negotiations if they hold significant voting power, giving management a
reason to placate them. 248
Given the advantages and economic premiums institutional investors
have gained from opting out of federal class action litigation, it appears
surprising that any institutional investor serves as a lead plaintiff at all.24 9 The
seeming superiority of opt-out litigation supports the view that institutional
investors serving as lead plaintiffs in federal securities class actions may be
"captured" and acting more in their counsel's interests than their own.25 0
Various rationales explain why many institutional investors serve as lead
plaintiffs in federal securities class actions. Some have charged that a "pay-to-
play" process motivates institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs
because contributions from leading plaintiffs' lawyers may assist in electing
the persons that control them.25 1 One empirical study found that "politicians
and political control negatively correlate with lead plaintiff appointments in
securities class actions," challenging the belief that the primary driver of
public pension fund activism in securities class actions is "pay-to-play." 25 2
Alternatively, institutional investors may agree to serve as lead plaintiffs
because they make the decision before seeing any settlement proposal and
because liability may initially be uncertain. By serving as lead plaintiff, the
248 Id.
249 Articulating this sentiment, Professor Coffee has acknowledged that a "plausible case can
be made that the institutional investor who has the opportunity to opt out is under a legal
obligation to do so" because fiduciary obligations may require them to act to maximize
benefits to their investors. Coffee, supra note 10, at 438-39.
250 For a discussion of regulatory capture, see Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Captuding This
Watchdog? The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Keeping the Special Interests Out of Its House,
40 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (2012).
251 See, eg. Pay-to-Play Torts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704107204574473310387443816
(calling for investigation of purported pay-to-play between plaintiffs' law firms and public
pension funds); Mark Maremont et al., Trial Lawyers Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703837004575013633550087098
(describing campaign contributions made by plaintiffs' law firms, including contributions
to politicians on public pension fund boards who pursued securities class actions with
contributing law firms); Progress on Pay to Play, WALL ST. J., Feb, 12, 2010,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703630404575053460496978800
(praising reforms designed to reduce purported pay-to-play).
252 David H. Webber, Is Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class
Actions?An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2031, 2080 (2010).
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institutional investor may gain insight into the strength of its claim that it
would not otherwise have if it did not participate.
Institutional lead plaintiffs may later accept low settlements for a variety
of reasons. Social dynamics may explain some willingness to settle: after
building a relationship with class counsel, the institutional lead plaintiff may
trust class counsel's judgment. Alternatively, institutional lead plaintiffs may
have a particularly low tolerance for litigation risk or a poor personal hand to
play. 253
Tempering the conclusion that opt-out actions always beat class actions, a
quick narrative about selection effects may also explain the success opt-out
actions have had and an additional rationale for why opt-outs recover more
than class actions. Institutional investors generally decide whether to opt-out
after reviewing a settlement offer, and they do not opt out every time. When
the proposed class settlement seems too low, institutional investors may be
more likely to opt out. When the proposed settlement seems adequate,
opting out may be less attractive. If institutional investors primarily opt out
to pursue strong cases and accept class settlement offers when they have
weak cases, opt-outs should generally recover more than settlements.
As a practical matter, opt-out plaintiffs enjoy more choices. If a
prospective opt-out has strong federal claims and the class has survived a
motion to dismiss, it may not oppose consolidation with the federal class.
After all, consolidation confers both benefits and disadvantages. It allows the
opt-out plaintiff to take advantage of class counsels' work and discovery. Yet
if the potential opt-out plaintiff believes its state-law claims superior, it may
avoid consolidation and preserve its state law claims by filing in state court.
2. Advantages Conferred by Divergent Legal Regimes
While the inherent advantages enjoyed by opt-out plaintiffs explain a
significant portion of the recovery differential, a significant portion may also
be attributable to differences between the legal regimes governing individual
and class litigation. Moving to state court further increases the advantages
enjoyed by opt-out plaintiffs. On the procedural front, opt-out plaintiffs that
elect to file in state courts do not face the PLSRA's restrictions, meaning that
many opt-out actions will avoid the strong inference standard and discovery
stay. 2 5 4 Additionally, opt-out plaintiffs may enjoy the ability to situate their
253 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 436 (discussing reasons for institutional investors to remain
with the herd in a class action).
254 For a discussion of the PLSRA's provisions, see supra Part I.
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action in a favorable forum, conferring significant "home court"
advantages. 25 5 Class actions and actions within the federal system may be
swept before the MDL Court by procedural motions. 25 6
In addition to these largely procedural rationales, many opt-out actions
may also enjoy substantive advantages under state law. 25 7 For example,
federal securities class actions under Rule lOb-5 generally cannot assert aiding
and abetting liability. 258 By suing under state law, opt-out plaintiffs may
expand their possible recovery pool and assert claims against defendants that
could not be reached under Rule 10b-5.259 Thus, by opting out, plaintiffs gain
access to legal rights that either Congress or the courts declined to allow
under federal law.
Despite the strong incentive to opt out of federal class action litigation,
economic realities limit the abilities of many investors to opt out.26 0 Plaintiffs
will not litigate negative value individual claims because they cost more to
litigate than can be recovered. This reality has seemingly checked the
expansion of the trend toward state court and state law actions.
In any event, continuing competition amongst plaintiffs' counsel will
undoubtedly increase the number of opt-out actions and drive litigation costs
down.26 1 Plaintiffs firms that lose the initial scrum to serve as lead counsel
have a strong incentive to solicit class members to opt out and file individual
actions. To be sure, they will not receive any fees from the controversy if
they do not represent anyone.262 If opt-outs continue to receive significant
255 See Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 2, at 314-15. Opt-outs also avoid the federal
multidistrict litigation process and any unfavorable local precedent created by the MDL
Court.
256 See supra Section I.H.2 for a description.
257 For a discussion of potentially superior state court remedies, see Marc I. Steinberg, The
Emergence of State Securities Laws: Part Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 395, 421-
27 (1993) ("[I]n certain situations, the state blue sky laws may be more favorable to
plaintiffs . . . .").
258 E.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994) (refusing to recognize aiding-and-abetting liability under the Rule 10b-5 cause of
action); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
("The § 10(b) implied private right of action does not extend to aiders and abettors.").
259 For a discussion of secondary liability for securities fraud under state law in state court,
see Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 475 (2011) ("The state approach to primary liability for securities
fraud is quite different from the federal scheme.").
260 Burch, supra note 2, at 1133 ("[O]pting out is a true option only for institutions and the
special few receiving individual legal advice.").
261 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 425-27.
262 Id. at 425.
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premiums for litigating state law claims in state court, plaintiffs' counsel will
find it progressively easier to convince institutional investors to opt out.
The trend may also accelerate rapidly if most circuit courts limit the
tolling of statutes of limitation or statutes of repose during the pendency of a
class action.26 3 Under American Poe & Construction Co. v. Utah, institutional
investors have been able to take a wait-and-see approach without worrying
about statutes of limitations, deciding whether to opt out at the settlement
stage.26 4 Because the Second Circuit recently held that American Pte tolling
does not extend to statutes of repose, institutional investors may not be able
to wait until seeing a settlement proposal if statutes of repose will foreclose
remedies. 26 5
The trend's continuing power will depend on where the breakpoint
between negative and positive value claims falls and how many institutional
investors opt out. Some evidence indicates that the threshold has grown
progressively smaller. Discussing this limitation in 2007, one major plaintiffs'
lawyer argued that the breakpoint for an opt-out action was approximately $1
billion in losses. 26 6 In 2009, the estimate for loss threshold fell to a mere $10
million.26 7 As discussed below, the rise of disaggregated classes may lower
this threshold further.
B. Emerging Disaggregated Classes: An Opt-In Class Action
Disaggregated class actions may lower the loss threshold for litigating
opt-out claims well below $10 million if the plaintiffs' counsel is able to
successfully aggregate enough reasonably sized claims to justify deploying the
263 See Kevin M. LaCroix, Supreme Court to Decide Securities Act Statute of Repose Issue in IndyMac
MBS Case, D&O DIARY (Mar. 11, 2014), available at
http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/03/articles/securities-litigation/supreme-court-to-
decide-securities-act-statute-of-repose-issue-in-indymac-mbs-case.
264 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (holding that "the commencement of a class action suspends the
applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have
been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action").
265 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir.
2013).
266 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 435 (citing David Lenckus, Individual Suits Likely Over Subprime
Losses; Some Investors Expected to Opt Out of Class Actions, Bus. INS., Nov. 19, 2007,
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20071118/ISSUE01/100023492?tags=%/`7C6
9%7C75).
267 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 314 (citing Stuart Grant, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Comments
as Panelist at American Bar Association's Litigation Section Conference (May 2, 2009)
(responding to question posed by Coffee who was moderator of securities litigation
panel)).
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tactic. In coining the term "disaggregated class," I refer to any collection of
dispersed but informally coordinated state court actions alleging largely
duplicative claims. In the securities litigation context, SLUSA's group-of-
lawsuits provision means that disaggregated classes will consist of multiple
state court actions with less than fifty individual plaintiffs alleging exclusively
state law claims. Plaintiffs adopt this procedural vehicle to evade removal and
SLUSA's limitations on the collective litigation of state law claims. 26 8 I have
chosen the term "disaggregated class" to describe this dynamic because these
informally coordinated state court opt-out actions are essentially class actions
spread across different courts and proceeding as defacto opt-in class actions.
This is not merely a new theoretical possibility but an emerging reality.
The tactic has been used repeatedly with varying degrees of success in
response to massive securities frauds like those perpetrated by Enron,
Worldcom, and Madoff.26 9
In essence, disaggregated classes allow plaintiffs' counsel to bring defacto
opt-in class actions. 27 0 The opt-in model requires claimants to take some
affirmative step to join a collective proceeding.27 1 While this opt-in model is
used in Europe, federal courts have held that true opt-in class actions are
unavailable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 2 Without any clear
procedural rule, the ad hoc disaggregated class has developed.
To overview issues arising in connection with this new phenomenon, I
first analyze concerns and cost issues affecting disaggregated classes before
discussing the dangers posed by state-court consolidation motions and by
other plaintiffs. I then discuss some of the strategic jockeying likely to occur
as more plaintiffs join disaggregated classes in pursuit of the opt-out
premium.
1. Disaggregated Class Construction
As an initial matter, disaggregated classes may be more likely to emerge in
the wake of large, widely publicized securities frauds. For these actions to
268 In re Tremont Sec. Law, State Law, & Ins. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 11117, 2013 WL 4730263, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013).
269 See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 29-99 (5th Cir. 2002); In re Worldcom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2004 WL 692746, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2004); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Tremont,
2013 WL 4730263, at *3.
270 See Coffee, suipra note 2, at 301-02.
271 Id.
272 Kern ex rel Estate of Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124-26 (2d Cir. 2004), ceit.
denied, 544 U.S. 1034 (2005) (reversing class certification of opt-in class).
350 Virginia Law & Business Review 9:305 (2015)
succeed, the potential recovery pie must be large enough to justify the costs
and risks associated with disaggregated classes. For example, massive
securities controversies like Enron, Worldcom, and Madoff may produce
enough opportunities for building disaggregated classes. Widespread media
coverage informs potential plaintiffs that they might have a claim and makes
it easier for counsel to acquire them as clients. Finally, large frauds generate
federal class actions and complaints designed to pass muster under the
PSLRA's standards. The public filing of these complaints may provide other
attorneys with much useful information. Yet significant transaction costs
remain.
a. Client Acquisition & Coordination Costs
A disaggregated class requires many clients. This reality favors firms that
have existing relationships with institutional clients. Many of these firms
already provide portfolio-monitoring services to institutional investors. 27 3
When one of their portfolio-monitoring clients suffers a substantial fraud-
related loss, the firm may have a large enough stake to justify an opt-out
action. After researching and filing the first state court action, the firm faces
diminishing marginal costs to file subsequent actions.27 4
For attorneys without a deep bench of institutional clients, client
acquisition and coordination presents a more substantial transaction cost
problem. To move to a disaggregated class structure instead of an ordinary
opt-out action, the attorney's outreach and client recruitment efforts must be
so successful that she gathers more than fifty individual or institutional
investors because SLUSA does not apply to actions with less than fifty
plaintiffs. Depending on the possible recovery, plaintiffs' counsel may make
different decisions about acquiring these clients. In many cases, simplistic
online advertisement targeting may suffice and be cost effective. 27 5 Attorneys
may also reach potential clients through blog postings, television, newspaper
or other appropriate methods if the possible recovery justifies the additional
outreach.
Yet, dangers abound and these decisions have ethical implications.
Attorneys seeking to form a disaggregated class must also take care to comply
with the rules regulating attorney advertising. In aggressively soliciting
273 Webber, supra note 76, at 167.
274 This dynamic may have led to the genesis of the disaggregated class.
275 Coffee, supra note 2, at 305 ("[C]hanges in technology also make the opt-in class more
feasible than in the past [because] . . . class counsel can solicit potential class members to
opt in through websites, emails, and electronic media.").
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potential opt-outs at an early stage, plaintiffs' firms have been chastised for
disrupting "the orderly class action process" and forced to issue curative
disclosures to potential opt outs that clarified and modified earlier
advertisements.276
Ethical concerns continue to apply and raise potential costs even after
contacting a sufficient number of investors. Attorneys representing groups of
plaintiffs must effectively coordinate action and manage conflicts. 2 7 7 To solve
this problem, some group representation agreement must be in force to
coordinate groups of plaintiffs effectively. 278
b. Investigation & Drafting Costs
Attorneys contemplating disaggregated classes also face costs in
investigating claims and bringing complaints. To a certain extent, counsel
may mitigate these costs by leveraging work done by other attorneys. The
federal Public Access to Court Electronic Records (commonly known as
"PACER") system grants ready access to the complaints and many other
documents filed in the federal securities class action for pennies a page.
Because the complaint will often include significant detail designed to
overcome the PSLRA's strong inference standard, counsel for the
disaggregated class may use others' allegations to guide their investigation,
effectively piggybacking off the work done by the lead counsel in the federal
securities class action. 279 In cases where the allegations in the federal class
action survived the PSLRA's strong inference standard, they will most likely
survive state court pleading requirements.
Of course, ethical concerns apply here as well. Professional ethics require
attorneys to conduct their own pre-filing investigation and satisfy themselves
that a reasonable basis for liability exists. 28 0 Crudely copying other attorneys'
filings may not satisfy this obligation.
276 E.g., In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(directing curative notice).
277 See Debra S. Katz, Legal Ethics in the Rpresentation ofMultiple Paties, SN029 ALI-ABA 1657,
1660 (2007).
278 Id. at 1680.
279 Although prior pleadings may help illuminate an area, counsel should take care not to
simply pass off the work of others as their own. See Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Profl
Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2002) (disciplining attorney for
plagiarizing a treatise).
280 In the federal context, Rule 11 requires that attorneys conduct a reasonable investigation
into any claim's merits. See, e.g., Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th
Cir. 1991).
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c. Filing & Litgation Costs
Disaggregated classes necessarily involve higher filing costs because
attorneys must file multiple complaints in multiple forums. As discussed
above, plaintiffs must divide and disperse their actions into groups of less
than fifty plaintiffs to avoid SLUSA. However, these filing fees may be de
minimus if the complaints seek substantial damages.
To an extent, counsel may reduce a disaggregated class's litigation costs
by implementing a staggered filing schedule. After drafting and filing the first
complaint, plaintiffs' firms may stay later-filed actions to avoid incurring
litigation costs while pursing discovery in the first action. While
confidentiality orders may preclude using discovery material from the first
filed action in other actions, plaintiffs' counsel will know about the material
and gain an information advantage. In any event, plaintiffs will likely be able
to obtain the same discovery in other actions.
2. State Court Consolidation & Prolf/era/ion Risks
Disaggregated classes may be glass cannons, dangerous but vulnerable.
Although not as efficient as the federal multidistrict litigation process, many
state court systems allow defendants to move to transfer cases from one state
court to another in certain circumstances. 281 Because these ordinary
procedural motions to transfer and consolidate may trigger SLUSA's group-
of-lawsuits provision, a disaggregated class may face dismissal if defendants
consolidate pieces of the disaggregated class or if unsophisticated plaintiffs
file related actions within the same court.
To illustrate the risk of consolidation, consider the facts in one set of
Florida-based actions comprising a disaggregated class. In litigation against a
group of hedge funds for losses arising out of Madoffs Ponzi scheme, a
single plaintiffs' firm created a disaggregated class by filing largely duplicative
actions in multiple Florida state courts. 28 2 In response, defendants moved to
transfer and consolidate the actions within Florida's state court system,
effectively restructuring the disaggregated class action and bringing it within
SLUSA's scope by consolidating more than fifty plaintiffs into a single state
281 E.g., Brown v. Hillsdale Cnty. Rd. Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 318, 320 (1983) (discussing
change of venue within Michigan state courts).
282 In re Tremont Sec. Law, State Law, & Ins. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 11117, 2013 WL 4730263, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013) (describing disaggregated class where "all of [the plaintiffs
were] . . . represented by the same law firm").
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court. 283 Once brought within the reach of SLUSA's group-of-lawsuits
provision, the defendants removed the disaggregated class and transferred its
constituent actions to the Southern District of New York through the MDL
process. 28 4 The plaintiffs' state law claims were then dismissed.285
Illustrating the issue from a different angle, plaintiffs within a
disaggregated class and uncoordinated plaintiffs face risks from additional
plaintiffs filing suit. For example, if a disaggregated class has deposited forty-
eight of its plaintiffs in a particular state court and an uncoordinated group of
five plaintiffs sues in the same court, all plaintiffs within the court would
likely lose their state law claims because the additional plaintiffs would move
the action within SLUSA's scope.
3. Strategic Behavior
As should be apparent by now, SLUSA drives irreconcilable procedural
conflicts. Plaintiffs will seek the expanded rights and remedies available
through individual or otherwise uncovered actions. Defendants will
vigorously litigate any borderline actions, attempting to push them
individually or collectively into SLUSA's scope because SLUSA's application
forces plaintiffs to litigate under more restrictive federal securities fraud
action rules. As each side stands to gain or lose measurably depending on
SLUSA's application, substantial resources will be expended in efforts to
bring it into or keep it out of play.
Once an attorney represents more than fifty plaintiffs, playing these
strategic games may become alluring.286 Attorneys often view the ethical rules
as requiring them to advocate zealously within the vague bounds of the law. 287
Because SLUSA precludes state law class action claims and effectively
precludes individual state law claims in federal court, a plaintiff may have an
incentive to file higher value individual claims in state court. When attorneys
represent more plaintiffs, they will likely use ethical rules to justify structuring
their actions in ways that preserve these claims.
Of course, different interpretations of ethical rules may also limit the rise
of disaggregated classes. While notions of zealous advocacy may lead
283 Id. at *1.
284 Id.
285 Id
286 See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2002).
287 Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney Advisor's
Touchstone 10-11 (University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 101, March
9, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567657.
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attorneys representing more than fifty plaintiffs to create disaggregated
classes, the ethics rules do not blink into existence after an attorney crosses
the fifty-plaintiff threshold. The decision to recruit additional plaintiffs for
duplicative actions in nearby courts also has ethical implications. The
inclusion of additional plaintiffs may be in tension with the duty of loyalty
owed to existing plaintiffs. 288
In response to these incentives, plaintiffs and defendants will behave
strategically in SLUSA's shadow, driving up public and private costs. 28 9 A
disaggregated class must remain dispersed to survive, so plaintiffs will likely
develop new strategies to address known or anticipated consolidation risks
and to reduce the risks they face from uncoordinated plaintiffs. 290 As
discussed below, much of this activity is likely to involve expanded
geographic dispersal or delayed filing tactics.
a. Expanded Dispersal & Distribution Effects
To avoid SLUSA, plaintiffs with the ability to file in multiple states may
begin scattering their cases across jurisdictional barriers, effectively mitigating
the dangers posed by consolidation motions. Because state courts generally
cannot transfer cases from one state court system to another, organized
groups of plaintiffs may simply scatter their actions across state lines. 291
While dispersing their cases, plaintiffs may also make strategic choices
when selecting the ideal forum state. Plaintiffs may further mitigate
consolidation risks by filing disaggregated classes within state court systems
without formal consolidation or coordination mechanisms for intra-state
cases. 292 The lack of any effective procedural mechanism to consolidate cases
may limit defendants' ability to rearrange actions to fall within SLUSA's
scope.
288 The rise of disaggregated classes poses complex ethical questions requiring additional
analysis. Attorneys considering adopting disaggregated classes must proceed carefully to
ensure that they do not breach duties to existing clients by seeking additional plaintiffs.
289 See Rose, supra note 50, at 2182-93, for a discussion of social costs in securities fraud
enforcement.
290 See Glover, supra note 24, at 37 n.124 (noting that dispersed state court actions will give
rise to the "largely undesirable, though likely inevitable reality of jurisdictional strategy and
gamesmanship").
291 Of course, factual realities may limit plaintiffs' ability to scatter their cases. State courts
with little connection to the dispute may be receptive to motions to dismiss onfonrm non
conveniens grounds. I put possible prudential or jurisdictional limitations on this strategic
behavior to the side for this Article.
292 See Glover, supra note 24, at 10-12 (noting state court consolidation deficiencies).
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b. Timing Effects
SLUSA may also cause organized groups of plaintiffs to stagger the filing
of their actions, further deconstructing their disaggregated class by breaking it
apart across time. To exploit timing, disaggregated classes may initially
proceed as a single action brought by a subset of the possible plaintiffs, with
the remaining plaintiffs waiting in the wings. From the defendants'
perspective, the disaggregated class's spear point may appear to be an
ordinary individual action.
Exploiting timing may carry significant advantages. If a test case
succeeds, additional cases may be filed in the same jurisdiction to take
advantage of any discovery or favorable precedent secured. In the event that
a test case fails, the remaining plaintiffs may file their cases in a different
jurisdiction. In the alternative, a later group of plaintiffs might seek to
recover under different legal theories. This may give coordinated groups of
plaintiffs significant advantages. Of course, this tactic could only be used so
long as statutes of limitations and repose do not foreclose additional attempts.
C. Public Costs Imposed by Disaggregated Classes
To endorse the status quo, policymakers must conclude that the benefits
provided by disaggregated classes and increased opt-out litigation outweigh
the public costs imposed. As more investors make use of the "exit" option,
these costs will increase. While room for further exploration exists, I set out
three different public cost issues below.
1. Potential Regressive Subsidies
Because institutional investors and disaggregated class members may
possess higher value claims than the negative value claims included within the
federal class action, gains to investors outside the class action may come at
the expense of investors unable to join disaggregated classes. 293 If this trend
continues, the securities class action may grow less relevant and simply serve
as "a vehicle of last resort for smaller retail investors." 294 Divergent outcomes
293 See Coffee, sipra note 10, at 409.
294 Id. at 429.
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for the rich and poor for claims involving the same securities challenge basic
fairness norms and may amount to regressive subsidies. 295
Nonetheless, the distributional impact of any regressive subsidy may be
difficult to quantify. Many institutional investors-pension funds and
retirement plans-hold their assets for the benefit of the middle and lower-
middle class. If these institutions experience outsize litigation gains, the
returns do not flow to society's wealthiest enclaves.
2. Increased Litgation Costs
As more investors opt out of federal securities class actions, litigation
costs will undoubtedly escalate and cases will occupy increasing amounts of
judicial time. Parties internalize some, but not all, of these costs. Defendants
will buy increasing amounts of attorney time to defend against multi-
jurisdictional litigation. Because the PSLRA's discovery stay does not apply in
state court actions, 296 the parties will likely engage in increasing amounts of
discovery. In many instances, the litigation and discovery will largely
duplicate litigation and discovery occurring in other dispersed state court
actions or in federal court actions, causing the parties to dissipate their own
and judicial resources. 297
Notably, as the use of disaggregated classes expands, public costs increase
more rapidly than private costs. With each additional action, the attorneys
involved may draw on their experience framing and litigating other actions
within the disaggregated class, growing increasingly efficient. In contrast,
each court involved must familiarize itself with the issues and make its own
decisions. While courts will take guidance from precedent generated through
this process, they do not benefit to the same extent as the litigants do from
the repetition.
Expanding state court securities litigation will lead to inconsistent
outcomes for defendants and plaintiffs. 298 This inconsistency may be
295 David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015).
296 See Perino, supra note 1, at 292.
297 The Supreme Court recognized this danger in Dabit, although as a threat posed by state
law class actions and not individual actions. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 86 (stating that limited
application of SLUSA "would give rise to wasteful, duplicative litigation.... The prospect
is raised, then, of parallel class actions proceeding in state and federal court, with different
standards governing claims asserted on identical facts."); see also Glover, supra note 24, at 6
("[D]uplicative discovery and other pre-trial litigation wastes the time and resources of
both the judiciary and of the parties.").
298 See Glover, supra note 24, at 10.
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pernicious and driven by different judges within the same state court system
making different decisions to interpret the same state laws, subjecting
defendants to conflicting rulings. 299 In this sense, expanding opt-out litigation
increases the likelihood of piecemeal litigation, contravening federal policy
goals.300
3. Increased Capital Costs & Inefficient CapitalAllocation
When securities litigation over-deters, it raises the cost of capital.301 If
civil liability becomes too expensive by imposing high costs in exchange for
limited benefits, investors may be less likely to allocate capital to a particular
securities market, instead preferring more efficient markets. 302 Increasing
numbers of opt-out actions likely raise the cost of capital further by forcing
defendants to pay more in total damages and by increasing defendants'
litigation costs.3 0 3
Opt-out litigation that proceeds under state law in state courts may be
particularly likely to increase the cost of capital because it increases liability for
parties who could not be reached through the Rule lOb-5 cause of action.
For example, the Supreme Court has sharply limited aiding and abetting
liability under Rule 10b-5.304 In contrast, state law will often permit recovery
for aiding and abetting.305  In practice, this means that accountants, lawyers,
299 Further inconsistency is likely to result when a disaggregated class stretches across
jurisdictional lines or exploits timing effects to proceed under different legal theories.
300 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976)
(recognizing federal policy preference to avoid piecemeal litigation).
301 See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising
the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 947 (1993).
302 Id. at 948.
303 For a discussion of how inefficient securities litigation makes raising capital more difficult,
see Joseph A. Grundfest, Wh7 y Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 733 (1995) ("An
inefficient litigation regime therefore increases the cost of capital for everyone, even
companies that are never sued. In addition, because it is impossible to determine ex ante
whether yet-to-be-filed litigation is meritorious, it is impossible to demonstrate that an
offering failed specifically because of the threat of non-meritorious litigation.").
304 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994) (refusing to recognize aiding-and-abetting liability under the Rule 10b-5 cause of
action); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
("The § 10(b) implied private right of action does not extend to aiders and abettors.").
305 Richard C. Mason, Civil Liabilitj for Aiding and Abetting, 61 Bus. LAW. 1135, 1177 (2006)
("[State c]ourts long have recognized aiding-abetting liability in connection with securities
actions brought pursuant to state law.").
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and others who provide services to issuers will increase the cost of their
services to incorporate the cost of state law liability. 06
In the same vein, defendants facing waves of opt-out litigation may
struggle to accurately calculate their liability, forcing them to hold more funds
in reserve to pay liabilities instead of reinvesting those funds or distributing
them more efficiently to shareholders. This uncertainty may prevent capital
from flowing through the economy as efficiently as it would without the risk
of unpredictable state law liability.
III. OPT-OUT ACTIONS BELONG IN FEDERAL COURT
Given the dynamics discussed above, it seems likely that the number of
opt-out suits will continue to increase. 07 As their impact grows, their costs
must be weighed against their benefits. To be sure, disaggregated classes and
state court opt-out actions allow certain plaintiffs to secure significant
benefits. Through opt-out actions, some claimants may raise claims that
would otherwise be too costly to litigate and may recover more than they
would as part of the federal class. Yet the benefits provided by disaggregated
classes seemingly come at high public and private costs. If these actions
continue to multiply, Congress will likely consider measures to bring opt-out
actions into federal court.
As discussed above, disaggregated classes appear to come with high costs
for both private parties and for the public. Furthermore, while new litigation
strategies may provide additional deterrence benefits, disaggregated classes
may significantly inflate costs without providing corresponding benefits.
Disaggregated classes and opt-out actions follow in the wake of securities
class actions. These follow-on actions increase the costs of defending against
already sprawling private securities litigation.308 As the severity of the
sanction increases, so too does the risk of overdeterrence.309
The simplest remedy may be to allow the JPML to remove opt-out
actions and disaggregated classes to federal court. Expanded removability has
been considered as a potential response before. Although not recommending
it himself, Professor Coffee spotlighted increased removability as a possible
306 Cf Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2014) ("[]he federal
securities laws have another purpose, beyond protecting investors. Namely, they also seek
to protect securities issuers, as well as the investment advisers, accountants, and brokers
who help them sell financial products, from abusive class-action lawsuits.").
307 See supra Part II.
308 See Rose, supra note 50, at 2188-90 (discussing the severity of sanctions).
309 Id.
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measure to slow the "growing rate of opt outs" in 2008.310 At that time, he
suggested that "the most effective and feasible measure would be to give the
JPML the power to consolidate state court individual actions with the federal
class action for purposes of pretrial discovery."'
Increased removability would effectively federalize a great deal of
securities fraud litigation. As explained above, once opt-out actions enter the
federal system, consolidation procedures sweep these actions within SLUSA's
scope, effectively precluding the plaintiffs from litigating state law claims. 3 1 2
In addition to these cost-benefit concerns, three strong arguments weigh
in favor of making opt-out actions removable. In Section A below, I discuss
optimal deterrence theory and how calibrating deterrence appears impossible
when litigants may simply opt out to pursue state court suits. In Section B
below, I review federalism concerns and note that it may be most appropriate
to regulate the national securities markets on a national basis. 313 In Section C,
I analyze disaggregated classes and the effects divergent liability standards
may have on the conduct of securities class actions. Ultimately, I conclude
that more uniform liability under federal law would likely make class counsel
more responsive to opt-out threats and more susceptible to voice-based
reforms.
A. Optimal Deterrence
Making opt-out actions and disaggregated classes removable will also
allow the federal government to better calibrate liability provisions in pursuit
of optimal deterrence. As it stands, the ability of parties to opt out of federal
law and federal courts limits the ability of federal regulatory bodies to
properly calibrate liability provisions in pursuit of optimal deterrence.
Ideally, capital markets benefit society by allocating capital to productive
uses, creating savings mechanisms and liquidity.3 14 The U.S. securities
market is an enormously important national asset and protecting its efficient
operation is a regulatory priority. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the
"magnitude of the federal interest in protecting the integrity and efficient
310 See Coffee, suipra note 10, at 442-43.
311 Id.
312 See supra Part II.
313 Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination, 111
MICH. L. REV. 647, 661 (2013) ("Wn some cases the states' lack of coordination will call
for broad application of federal laws.").
314 Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 767 (1985).
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operation of the market for nationally traded securities cannot be
overstated.""
Although integrity and efficiency generally walk side-by-side, their paths
sometimes diverge in the land of private securities litigation. In the secondary
market, securities fraud often transfers wealth among equally blameless
investors.316 This happens because non-trading fraudsters often supply
misinformation to the secondary market. When this happens, a security's
secondary market value will rise or fall because of the misinformation.317
Many scholars have argued that it makes little sense to spend significant
enforcement resources to recover fraud losses in this context because well-
diversified investors will likely experience roughly equivalent losses and gains
from fraud over time. 1 Seeking to maximize market integrity would be
extraordinarily inefficient and leave everyone poorer for it.19
Using slightly different language, supporters of private securities litigation
generally advance two rationales to support the maintaining liability: investor
compensation and deterrence. 320 Academics generally focus on the
deterrence rationale because the compensatory rationale has well documented
weaknesses. 321
The deterrence rationale has a history of judicial support. In recognizing
an implied right of action under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the
Supreme Court argued that "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules
provides a necessary supplement to Commission action" because the
Commission did not have the resources to closely vet proxy materials. 322 The
Court extended this rationale repeatedly in subsequent cases and, at times,
explicitly sought to protect "the deterrent value of private rights of action"
315 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006). See also In re
Herald, 730 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that abuse of private securities actions
"may . . . injure the efficient operation of [financial] markets and this country's
competitive position in the world's economy").
316 Rose, supra note 50, at 2180-81.
317 See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L.
REv. 639, 642 (1996) (critiquing compensatory out-of-pocket loss measures).
318 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIs.
L. REv. 333, 337.
319 As market participants purchase securities to gain wealth, wealth maximization seems a
valid criterion in this area.
320 Coffee, supra note 71, at 1538.
321 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 54, at 1309 ("[]he modern Rule 10b-5 class action ... provides
little if any meaningful compensation to investors, and instead finds its primary
justification in its potential deterrent effect.").
322 J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("Time does not permit an independent
examination of the facts set out in the proxy material.").
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because they "provide a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the
securities laws and are a necessary supplement to commission action."3 23
Effectively deterring securities fraud improves the functioning of the
capital markets and corporate governance because it increases the accuracy of
information available to investors, improving their ability to allocate capital.
To the extent that investors in the primary market suspect that issuers
misrepresent facts about their businesses, investors will predictably reduce the
amount of money they are willing to pay for securities or shift purchases to a
more honest market.3 24 Misinformation may also impose social costs in the
secondary market by making capital allocation less effective.3 25 From a
corporate governance perspective, accurate disclosures improve corporate
decisions about selecting and managing investment projects.3 26
Despite the significant benefits obtainable from deterring fraud,
unthinkingly maximizing securities fraud deterrence can result in over-
deterrence, which also harms the capital markets and causes inefficiency
because legal prohibitions against fraud impose social costs. 3 27 Extensive
private deterrence efforts-especially those exemplified by disaggregated
classes-tie up resources in litigation efforts. Excessive deterrence can also
increase the cost of capital if companies over-invest in precautionary
measures or if financial intermediaries, such as accountants, lawyers and
bankers, charge more for their services to reflect the risks posed by state law
liability.3 28
Optimal deterrence theory seeks to chart a path between rampant fraud
in an environment that under-deters and excessive costs in a red-tape-filled
world of over-deterrence. 329 Under optimal deterrence theory, for securities
fraud liability to be justified, it must "save more in social costs from fraud
323 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
324 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatoy Disclosure and the Protection of Investors,
70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-75 (1984).
325 Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J.
977 (1992) (arguing that certain stock price inaccuracies impose social costs and lead to
inefficient capital allocations).
326 Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 253 (2009)
("Disclosure does, however, enhance efficiency by improving corporate decisions relating
to which proposed new investment projects in the economy are selected for
implementation and how already existing projects are operated.").
327 Rose, supra note 50, at 2183-84.
328 Id. at 2184.
329 See generally Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REv. 1583, 1606 (2010)
(discussing optimal deterrence theory); Rose, supra note 50, at 2178-93 (presenting a
primer on optimal deterrence of securities fraud).
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than it creates in enforcement costs." 330 Although perfectly optimal
deterrence may be difficult to achieve in practice, the framework provides a
useful guide for evaluating the scope of private securities fraud liability.
A hard-eyed focus on optimal deterrence may lead to some inequitable
wealth distribution while maximizing market functioning overall. This
happens because a deterrence regime does not focus on distributions of
societal wealth and the remedies necessary to ensure compensation may
impose more costs than gains produced. 331 A deterrence-focused regime
might also shift investor behavior, mitigating inequitable distributions. If
compensation for many types of fraud were not available or less certain,
investors would simply discount the price they were willing to pay "to reflect
deterrence's failure in a certain percentage of cases," resulting in securities
pricing that would be "fair ex ante, even though some investors [would]
suffer a loss ex post." 3 3 2
As Professor Rose has explained, lawmakers seeking to deter securities
fraud optimally must make choices about how to structure the liability regime.
These choices include: "(1) the scope of the substantive fraud prohibition; (2)
the threatened sanctions; (3) the procedural rules governing investigation and
adjudication of claims; and (4) the enforcer."3 33 As these design choices force
unavoidable tradeoffs between over-deterrence and under- deterrence,
lawmakers must carefully consider how to design an appropriate liability
regime.
The private enforcement experience after the PSLRA makes clear that a
key additional consideration in a well-designed securities fraud liability
framework is the consolidation of enforcement control in a single liability
regime without the ability to shift fora. As explained above, Congress passed
SLUSA to increase federal control over securities class actions because
plaintiffs had been evading the PSLRA's procedural rules and the substantive
scope of federal law by simply filing class actions in state court and under
state law. 3 3 4 Forum-shifting impedes efforts to tailor the liability regime to
better deter securities fraud.
The growing trend toward individual actions under state law in state
courts also threatens federal control over liability for activity within the
national securities markets. Individual state law actions differ significantly
330 Rose, sipra note 50, at 2178.
331 Id. at 2180-81.
332 Fox, sipra note 326, at 283.
333 Rose, sipra note 50, at 2184.
334 H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3-4 (1998).
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from federal law in terms of the scope of liability, the procedural rules
governing litigation, and the identity of the enforcer.3 5
These differences mean that liability shifts designed to optimize private
securities liability and improve national market functioning will outright fail or
secure fewer benefits than contemplated because private enforcement activity
will shift to state court.33 6
B. Federalism Concerns
The federal government is best situated regulate national market
securities. The federal system provides familiar and oft-discussed costs and
benefits. As to the benefits, it allows states to address local concerns
responsively in keeping with local tastes. 337 As states take different
approaches, their efforts create "more innovation and experimentation in
government" and may generate superior solutions to problems.338 Still, these
federal benefits also come with significant costs. Inconsistent state and
federal laws may interfere with interstate commerce, increase coordination
costs and create "spillover" effects when one state's regulations alter behavior
in other states.339
As Professor Perino and other scholars have concluded, an analysis of
these costs and benefits shows that "there is only a weak case for maintaining
dual state-federal authority over" the market for nationally traded securities. 340
As state law liability for fraud directed at the national securities market
33s A disaggregated class's litigation governance is likely to be controlled by the attorneys
litigating on its members' behalf. For example, in securities litigation arising out of
HBO's improper recognition of revenue, attorneys appeared to be attempting to form a
disaggregated class by including in their retainer agreement that the plaintiffs were
"agreeing 'to abide by the decisions of the Steering Committee,' a body appointed by the
attorneys, which will consist of an unspecified number of other shareholder clients." In re
McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1241-42 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(quoting from retainer agreement).
336 I put to the side questions about the contours of an optimal deterrence focused federal
regime. A federal optimal deterrence framework does not need to be developed to
recognize that the goal is likely unobtainable without more exclusive regulatory control.
337 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1493 (1987).
338 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
3 See Perino, supra note 1, at 321 (summarizing federalism's costs).
340 Id.; see also Rose, supra note 50, at 2206 ("This formulation supports assigning the federal
government responsibility for deterring fraud in the national securities markets, while
assigning state governments responsibility for deterring fraud targeted at their respective
local capital markets.").
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implicates more than purely local interests, federal regulation better addresses
the problem.3 41
Yet these federalism concerns do not apply with equal force to all
securities suits. As mentioned above, SLUSA's so-called "Delaware carve-
out" preserves state law class actions for corporate governance suits based on
the law of the state of the issuer's incorporation.3 42 Because the internal
affairs doctrine effectively coordinates the choice of law issue for corporate
governance disputes, federal preemption is less appropriate.3 43
Largely, Congress has embraced this thesis already. Securities regulation
and private securities liability has moved gradually toward increased federal
oversight with the growth of national securities markets. NSMIA and SLUSA
exemplify this trend. Both define national market securities in the same way
and shift substantial regulatory power from state to federal law. 3 4 4
In enacting SLUSA, Congress embraced these arguments with respect to
class action litigation.345 The remaining issue is whether many private,
individual state law claims now warrant the same treatment. As discussed
above, this issue is already settled for many of the individual state law claims
now removed to federal court. 3 4 6
The currently un-removable individual claims lurking within state court
systems do not deserve different treatment. The increasing trend toward
disaggregated classes and institutional investor opt-out litigation seemingly
challenges the merit of distinguishing between individual and class action
claims. Making these actions removable would promote greater uniformity
and avoid the harms detailed above.
In any event, shifting these claims to federal court and federal law seems
unlikely to destroy the ability of opt-outs to litigate their own actions. Opt-
outs enjoy tremendous inherent advantages over unwieldy class actions. 347
341 See Perino, supra note 1, at 321.
342 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A), 77p(d).
343 See O'Connor & Ribstein, supra note 313, at 677 (recognizing that the internal affairs
doctrine makes preemption "unnecessary because the states have achieved horizontal
coordination of their differing substantive rules through uniformly applied choice-of-law
rules").
344 Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that
SLUSA borrows its definition of national market securities from NSMIA).
345 S. REP. No. 105-82, at 4 (1998) (stating that the Committee "found the interest in
promoting efficient national markets to be the more convincing and compelling"
argument over its "affront on Federalism").
346 As discussed above, the federal courts to consider the issue have nearly uniformly
concluded that SLUSA properly extends to claims consolidated with related federal court
actions.
347 See supra Part 11(A) (i).
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Rather, federalizing securities litigation creates more uniform liability and may
lower the cost of capital.
C. Litigation Governance
Making disaggregated classes and opt-out actions removable may also
improve the private securities class action. Pruning the exit option to limit
opt-outs to federal court and federal law would likely yield significant
improvements by motivating sophisticated and significant stake-holding
litigants to push for accountability and by making it possible for class counsel
to compete on a level field in the market for legal services.
Much of the debate over how to govern securities class actions has drawn
heavily from Albert 0. Hirschman's seminal book, Exit, Voice, and Loyaly,
with scholars discussing different ways to improve litigation governance.3 48
In it, Hirschman argues that persons dissatisfied with any organization must
elect between some combination of exit and voice to address their
concerns.3 49 When persons elect to exit, they leave the organization. When
they use their voice, they press for change from within.5 0
Voice-amplifying proposals abound. Professor Webber has argued that
courts should attempt to amplify the voices of individual investors by
appointing sophisticated individual investors as co-lead plaintiffs."' In the
same vein, Professor Burch has argued that courts should appoint additional
lead plaintiffs as necessary to protect varied interests within the claSS.3 5 2 The
PSLRA even incorporated Elliott J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman's voice-
based proposal to designate the largest stakeholders as lead plaintiffs."
Focusing on the complementary "exit" option, Professor Coffee has
written extensively about the merits of an exit option as a tool for disciplining
class counsel.3 5 4 He correctly points out that whenever "one detects slack or
consistently substandard performance in a market (including a market for
professional services), it is usually a safe diagnosis to predict that competition
348 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimnagy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 337, 366-80 (1999) (discussing HIRSCHMAN, supra note 110).
349 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 110.
35 Id
351 See Webber, supra note 76, at 224.
352 Burch, supra note 2, at 1134-55.
3s3 Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 83, at 2105-08.
354 See Coffee, supra note 112, at 417-28; Coffee, supra note 2, at 306-28; Coffee, supra note
10.
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is lacking in the relevant market." 5 5 Reasoning from this premise, he takes
the "optimistic perspective" and argues that increased use of the exit option
will create competition and improve class counsel's performance. 356
Professor Coffee's analysis rings true. Yet competition may also be
improved by leveling the legal playing field. Class counsel should scrap for
larger settlements when the difference obtainable would keep opt-outs within
the class. However, even assuming class counsel could litigate more
vigorously and double the class settlements recovered, opt-out litigation in
state court under state law might still offer claimants a higher return than they
might recover by remaining in the class-if the anticipated recovery premium
were attributable to differences between state and federal law. Most class
action settlements recover approximately two to three percent of losses.357 In
contrast, as described above, opt-outs may recover seven to fifty times more,
often in a state court action under state law.3 58
At present, opt-out actions and class actions do not compete on the same
playing field. By opting out, investors may gain access to more favorable state
substantive law and procedures and may largely avoid insolvency constraints
limiting the ability of class counsel to demand significant increases in
settlement size. 359 Because securities fraud classes generally bring large gross
claims, they may be forced to settle for an amount less than they might
recover at trial to avoid triggering corporate bankruptcy. In contrast, opt-out
plaintiffs may demand a higher percentage recovery without fearing that their
settlement demands will bankrupt a defendant.
Preempting state law claims and forcing opt-outs to litigate in federal
court under the same law and procedural rules would level the playing field
somewhat. It might also enhance the efficacy of the exit option as a tool for
keeping class counsel working because class counsel may be more likely to
fight when she believes she can win and when goaded by the voices of
shareholders unable to resort to alternate forums and substantive laws.
Importantly, pruning back the exit option by making institutional opt-out
actions and disaggregated classes removable would not remove all
opportunities for exit. Plaintiffs dissatisfied with class counsel's performance
or a particular settlement offer would still enjoy the right to opt out and
pursue their own claims under federal law.
3ss Coffee, supra note 10, at 414.
356 Id. at 442; Coffee, supra note 2, at 309 (arguing that "in theory, ... exit may outperform
voice in the world of litigation governance").
3s7 Coffee, supra note 2, at 313.
3ss See supra Part II.
359 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 315-16.
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Even with the state law option removed, opt-out plaintiffs will likely still
secure larger recoveries than the class. To be sure, limiting the exit option to
federal law would not change an opt-out plaintiffs ability to escape
insolvency constraints and demand a higher percentage recovery without fear
of tipping a defendant into bankruptcy. Additionally, plaintiffs with strong
appetites for litigation risk may also opt out of reasonable settlement offers to
chase larger individual recoveries. They will likely secure higher returns by
accepting more risk. If only a small percentage of class members opt out,
class counsel may have accurately gauged the class's appetite for litigation
risk-even with a relatively low settlement.
Hirschman captured this dynamic in the final chapter of Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty. Addressing situations where an "organization is not particularly
sensitive to" exit, he wrote that policymakers might consider enabling voice
and "raising the costs of exit and even by reducing the opportunities for it." 360
By making state court opt-out actions removable and making exit less
attractive, class members may be more likely to use their voices to drive
change. If unable to secure unique advantages under state law, institutional
investors may become more likely to remain within the class and supervise
class counsel. In any event, the PLSRA's lead plaintiff provision seems
unlikely to succeed if the money, i.e. institutional investors, does not monitor
class counsel because it prefers an alternative forum and substantive law.
CONCLUSION
The rise of disaggregated classes poses serious challenges to efforts to
regulate federal securities fraud class action litigation. The tactic drives
significant public costs that may not be outweighed by any deterrence benefit.
Spreading duplicative actions across many courts increases the likelihood of
inconsistent outcomes, and dissipates judicial and party resources. Over time,
it may also diminish federal law as the dominant source for private securities
liability, frustrating the PSLRA's objectives. The state law lawsuits may also
drain defendants' coffers, leaving less for the federal class to recover.
As explained above, this has already occurred by process of law for cases
that can currently be removed into the federal system. Although this
outcome is consistent with Congress's aim to limit state law securities fraud
litigation, SLUSA's legislative history does not establish that Congress
intended to drive most individual state law claims out of federal court. It also
360 HIRSCHMAN, sipra note 110, at 122-23 (emphasis added).
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seems unlikely that Congress would have endorsed the rise of disaggregated
classes or intended that different substantive laws apply to high-value and
low-value claims.
Current trends toward disaggregated classes litigating opt-out actions in
state court seemingly frustrate the policy goals behind the PSLRA, SLUSA
and Supreme Court decisions limiting the scope of private securities liability.
For these initiatives to regulate the national securities markets effectively,
market participants must not be subjected to alternative systems of regulation
and liability. State law liability undercuts these goals because it imposes costs
outside federal control and creates instability.
This is not to say that the federal scheme for private securities litigation
merits uncritical praise-it too has flaws. Overly restrictive federal court rules
may make it too difficult or too costly to prove fraud for informed investors
with concentrated positions seeking above-market returns.3 61 By chasing
profits, these investors create market efficiency and incorporate disclosed
information into stock prices. These investors, who hold concentrated
positions, may not be as likely to net out their fraud losses. Moreover, for
normative reasons, society may tolerate-or even support-some over-
deterrence to ensure compensation for fraud victims.3 6 2
Yet allowing plaintiffs with higher-value claims to access different legal
systems than plaintiffs within the federal class does not seem like a satisfying
answer to these problems. If anything, an unconstrained exit option may
make participating in voice-based reforms less attractive. It may also reduce
the incentive to battle against improper limitations on federal liability. A
pension fund that regularly recovers substantial damages in state court will
not be motivated to lobby for improvements in federal law.
Accordingly, I call for Congress to prune the state law "exit" option and
level the playing field by making opt-out actions and disaggregated classes
removable. The policy concerns reviewed in this article may guide this
complex task. 363 Discussions about this dynamic may also create political
conditions permitting Congress to revisit the PSLRA's wisdom.
361 See Webber, supra note 76, at 169-70.
362 See Rose, supra note 50, at 2181.
363 See Perino, supra note 1, at 277 ("[C]arefully constructed federal preemption may be
appropriate because preemption addresses the unintended shift of litigation to state court
and because such an allocation of governmental authority comports well with principles
of federalism.").
